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Introduction
Modern macroeconomic research originated in the 1970’s in what became known as
the “rational expectations revolution” (Lucas, 1972; Sargent and Wallace, 1976). The
introduction of expectations that are consistent with the predictions of the model chal-
lenged the conventional debate on macroeconomic stabilization. Up until then, the
government has either been considered to play an important part in stabilizing busi-
ness cycles (Keynes and followers) or, opposed to this view, to amplify them (Friedman
and followers). Challenging the prevailing debates, Sargent and Wallace put forward
the policy ineffectiveness proposition: When economic agents do not make systematic
errors in their forecasts, central banks cannot systematically surprise agents and, thus,
can neither systematically amplify nor stabilize the business cycle. In this view, central
banks should only focus on inflation because they have no systematic effect on output
(Barro and Gordon, 1983). At the same time, Barro (1974) formalized the idea that
economic agents internalize the government budget constraint, and government paper
therefore does not constitute net worth to households. Barro’s result, known as the Ri-
cardian equivalence theorem, severely limits the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic
stabilization.
The “rational expectations revolution” also brought about a change in how the econ-
omy was modeled. In the new models aggregate relations were the result of optimal
decision making by economic agents, and the economy as a whole was cast as a dy-
namic stochastic equilibrium. Since then, macroeconomic research has stayed faithful
to this methodology but has qualified, and continues to qualify, what macroeconomic
stabilization can achieve. The main thrust of this literature has been to study monetary
policy under the assumption of sticky prices while leaving aside government financing
decisions since they are irrelevant for the allocation under Ricardian equivalence (see,
e.g., Woodford, 2001). The Ricardian equivalence theorem applies if households are
linked by inter-generational altruism, taxes are lump-sum, and financial markets are
perfect.
This thesis follows the literature in assuming sticky prices, but relaxes the assump-
tion of complete financial markets in the analysis of business cycles. It builds on the
so-called “incomplete markets” literature that investigates household consumption and
savings behavior in the absence of full insurance. Early contributions by Bewley (1979),
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Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) describe the steady state properties of an economy
in which households only have access to a non-contingent risk-free asset to smooth con-
sumption in the face of idiosyncratic income risk. The major challenge in analyzing
this class of models is that aggregates, including prices, depend on the entire wealth
distribution. The extension by Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) overcomes this problem
by approximating the wealth distribution with a finite number of its moments and,
thus, allows to compute dynamic equilibria with aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
Equilibria in this environment are generally not Pareto optimal because real inter-
est rates are lower than the rate of time preference, and the government may provide
additional savings vehicles at low cost. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) quantify this
trade-off in a model with capital and public debt, in which the latter has to be financed
by distortionary taxation. They find a positive amount of public debt to be optimal,
because, although a higher interest rate crowds out capital, it effectively loosens house-
holds’ borrowing constraints and thereby enhances households’ consumption-smoothing
capacity. Consequently, when financial markets are incomplete, the method of govern-
ment financing affects households’ consumption and savings decision. The failure of
Ricardian equivalence breaks with the modern tradition of business cycle analysis and
puts household balance sheets at the center stage of analysis.
The economic intuition that ensues from this resembles earlier work by Tobin (1969)
and Brunner and Meltzer (1972) that predates the “rational expectations revolution.”
Tobin thought that asset disaggregation is essential for analyzing monetary policy and
financing of government deficits. In his view, government paper in particular is different
from other assets because its nominal return is not determined by market forces –
money has a fixed nominal return of zero and the central bank determines the nominal
return on short-run treasuries. Brunner and Meltzer also understood macroeconomic
imbalances through the lens of asset markets. According to this literature, equilibrium
in asset markets determines the short-run response of the economy, while prices in the
goods market respond with a lag. My thesis shares this view and provides a micro-
founded business cycle model in the rational expectations tradition that incorporates
heterogeneity in household portfolios.
As such, my thesis contributes to assessing the importance of market incompleteness
for business cycle dynamics and macroeconomic policy. The first chapter presents the
result of joint research with Christian Bayer, Volker Tjaden, and Lien Pham-Dao, and
contributes to the literature on uncertainty driven business cycles. The second chapter
contributes to the literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The
third chapter presents the result of joint research with Christian Bayer and Lien Pham-
Dao, and contributes to the literature on fiscal policy.
CHAPTER 1. Shocks to household income are persistent and their variance changes
substantially over the business cycle. Fluctuations in this risk might be an important
driver of business cycles in so far as they give rise to fluctuations in precautionary savings
and, thus, consumption. The joint work “Precautionary Savings, Illiquid Assets, and
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the Aggregate Consequences of Shocks to Household Income Risk” (Bayer et al., 2015)
assesses the importance of this channel. Toward this end, we build a New Keynesian dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with asset-market incompleteness,
idiosyncratic income risk, and sticky prices. The novel feature of the model is to allow
for portfolio choice between liquid and illiquid assets in a business-cycle framework.
In a first step, we estimate a stochastic volatility process for earnings that serves as
input for the DSGE model. Households are subject to idiosyncratic productivity risk
that varies according to our estimated process. We find that fluctuations in income
risk generate sizable swings in precautionary savings that have significant aggregate
consequences. Households respond to higher income risk by increasing their savings,
but importantly do so by hording liquid paper assets. Households that participate in
the capital market sell the illiquid asset because the liquid asset is superior for short-
term consumption smoothing. Consequently, consumption and investment fall, which
leads to sizable output losses in a demand-determined economy. The central bank can
prevent this from happening by satisfying any excess demand for liquid assets.
CHAPTER 2. Monetary policy, at least in normal times, takes the form of the central
bank setting the short-term interest rate and thereby affecting economic activity. The
transmission mechanism relies on the effect of the real rate of interest on the optimal
allocation of consumption over time. Optimal consumption plans, however, are not
necessarily implementable because of borrowing constraints. These apply to a larger
fraction of households than previously thought because assets differ in their degree of
liquidity.
In the work “Transmission of Monetary Policy with Heterogeneity in Household
Portfolios” (Luetticke, 2015), I assess the importance of the distribution of liquid and
illiquid assets for the transmission of monetary policy in a DSGE model with sticky
prices and heterogeneity in household portfolios. My main finding is that the direct
effect of changes in the path of the real interest rate on consumption and savings is
substantially lower than in a setup with complete markets. Monetary policy instead
primarily works through indirect equilibrium effects on income.
The reversal in the importance of direct and indirect effects has important implica-
tions for the transmission of monetary policy. Control over the real interest rate is not
sufficient to stabilize aggregate activity. The transmission of monetary policy to the
real economy also requires a functioning labor market in this economy. Moreover, the
weakening of the interest rate channel of monetary policy questions the existing results
on optimal monetary policy rules.
CHAPTER 3. Discretionary transfers from the government to households with the
aim of stabilizing aggregate demand have become one of the most important policy
responses to recessions. These so-called “fiscal stimulus payments” have been used by
the U.S. government during the last two recessions in 2001 and 2008/2009. In both
periods, the sum total of all payments was about half a percentage point of GDP.
The aggregate effects of such transfers, however, are not well understood. A large
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empirical literature exploits random variation in the timing of payments to estimate
the causal effect on household spending. This literature finds an average propensity
to consume of about 1/3. We take up this evidence in “Fiscal Stimulus Payments and
Precautionary Investment” (Bayer et al., 2016) and ask whether these empirical findings
imply that “fiscal stimulus payments” are indeed expansionary?
Simulating this policy in a DSGE model with heterogeneity in household portfolios,
we find that transfers do not only work through the disposable income channel but also
by positively affecting household liquidity. Transfers increase individual liquidity and
debt finance enhances market liquidity. This has consequences when the government
retires this debt. Then households shift their savings into the physical asset to retain
their enhanced consumption-smoothing capacity. This leads to a prolonged increase in
capital and output. We find that this liquidity channel is stronger than wealth effects
induced by government fincancing decisions and, thus, makes the aggregate effects of
transfers expansionary independent of the mode of financing.
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Chapter 1
Precautionary Savings, Illiquid Assets, and
the Aggregate Consequences of Shocks to
Household Income Risk
Households face large income uncertainty that varies substantially over the
business cycle. We examine the macroeconomic consequences of these vari-
ations in a model with incomplete markets, liquid and illiquid assets, and
a nominal rigidity. Heightened uncertainty depresses aggregate demand
as households respond by hoarding liquid “paper” assets for precautionary
motives, thereby reducing both illiquid physical investment and consump-
tion demand. This translates into output losses, which a central bank can
prevent by providing liquidity. We show that the welfare consequences of
uncertainty shocks crucially depend on a household’s asset position. House-
holds with little human capital but high illiquid wealth lose the most from
an uncertainty shock and gain the most from stabilization policy.
1. Introduction
The Great Recession has brought about a reconsideration of the role of uncertainty
in business cycles. Increased uncertainty has been documented and studied in various
markets, but uncertainty with respect to household income stands out in its size and
importance. Shocks to household income are persistent and their variance changes
substantially over the business cycle. The seminal work by Storesletten et al. (2001)
estimates that during an average NBER recession, income uncertainty faced by U.S.
households, interpreted as income risk – i.e. the variance of persistent income shocks,
is more than twice as large as in expansions.
These sizable swings in household income uncertainty lead to variations in the
propensity to consume if asset markets are incomplete so that households use pre-
cautionary savings to smooth consumption. This paper quantifies the aggregate con-
sequences of this precautionary savings channel of uncertainty shocks by means of a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In this model, households have access
to two types of assets to smooth consumption. They can either hold liquid money or
invest in illiquid but dividend paying physical capital. This asset structure allows us
5
to disentangle savings and physical investment and obtain aggregate demand fluctu-
ations.1 To obtain aggregate output effects from these fluctuations, we augment this
incomplete markets framework in the tradition of Bewley (1979) by sticky prices a` la
Calvo (1983).
We model the illiquidity of physical capital by infrequent participation of households
in the capital market, such that they can trade capital only from time to time. This
can be considered as an approximation to a more complex trading friction as in Kaplan
and Violante (2014), who follow the tradition of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) in
modeling the portfolio choice between liquid and illiquid assets.
In this economy, when idiosyncratic income uncertainty increases, individually opti-
mal asset holdings rise and consumption demand declines. Importantly, households also
rebalance their portfolios toward the liquid asset because it provides better consump-
tion smoothing. These effects are reminiscent of the observed patterns of the share of
liquid assets in the portfolios of U.S. households during the Great Recession (see Figure
1.1). According to the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, the share of liquid assets in
the portfolios increased relative to 2004 across all wealth percentiles, with the strongest
relative increase for the lower middle-class. In our model, this portfolio rebalancing
towards liquid paper reinforces, through a decline in physical investment, the decline
in consumption demand caused by higher uncertainty. Consequently, aggregate de-
mand declines even more strongly than consumption and investment and consumption
co-move.
Quantitatively, we find the following: a two standard deviation increase in household
income uncertainty decreases aggregate activity by roughly 0.5% on impact and 0.4%
over the first year under the assumption of a monetary policy that follows a constant
nominal money growth rule (Friedman’s “k% rule”). This is about half the effect size
that Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015) report for a fiscal policy uncertainty at the zero
lower bound. Imposing a Taylor-type rule for monetary policy as estimated in Chowd-
hury and Schabert (2008), we still find a 0.3% decrease in output upon the uncertainty
shock. This is more than twice as large as the effect of fiscal policy uncertainty in
“normal” non zero-lower-bound times reported in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015).
Importantly, in all cases the economy recovers only sluggishly over a five-year horizon
in our model.
Since the relative price of capital falls but the value of money increases upon an
uncertainty shock, such a shock has not only aggregate but also rich distributional
consequences. Our welfare calculations imply that households rich in physical or hu-
man capital lose the most, because factor returns fall in times of high uncertainty. In
contrast, welfare losses decline in money holdings as their value appreciates. To under-
stand the welfare consequences of systematic policy responses to uncertainty shocks,
we compare a regime where monetary policy follows Friedman’s k%-rule to one where
monetary policy provides additional money to stabilize inflation. Since an uncertainty
shock effectively works like a demand shock in our model, monetary policy is able to
reduce the negative effects on output and alleviate welfare consequences. On aver-
1In a standard Aiyagari (1994) economy, where all savings are in physical capital, an increase in
savings does not lead to a fall in total demand (investment plus consumption) because savings increase
investments one-for-one.
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Figure 1.1: Portfolio share of liquid assets by percentiles of wealth, 2010 vs. 2004
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Notes: Portfolio share: Net liquid assets/Net total assets. Net liquid assets:
cash, money market, checking, savings and call accounts, as well as government
bonds and T-Bills net of credit card debt. Cash holdings are estimated by
making use of the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice for 2008, as in Kaplan
and Violante (2014). Households with negative net liquid or net illiquid wealth,
as well as the top 5% by net worth, are excluded from the sample. The bar
chart displays the average change in each wealth decile, and the dotted line an
Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear smoother with bandwidth 0.15.
age, households would be willing to forgo 0.41% of their consumption over the first 20
quarters to eliminate the uncertainty shock, but this number is reduced to 0.25% with
stabilization. In the latter regime, households rich in human capital pay the cost of
the stabilization policy, because they save (partly in money) and thereby finance the
monetary expansion. Moreover, without stabilization, these households profit from low
prices of the illiquid asset in which they accumulate their long-term savings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts off with a review
of the related literature. Section 3 develops our model, and Section 4 discusses the
solution method. Section 5 introduces our estimation strategy for the income process
and explains the calibration of the model. Section 6 presents the numerical results.
Section 7 concludes. An Appendix follows that provides details on the properties of
the value and policy functions, the numerics, the estimation of the uncertainty process
from income data, and further robustness checks.
2. Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the recent literature that explores empirically and theoretically
the aggregate effects of time-varying uncertainty. The seminal paper by Bloom (2009)
discusses the effects of time-varying (idiosyncratic) productivity uncertainty on firms’
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factor demand, exploring the idea and effects of time-varying real option values of
investment. This paper has triggered a stream of research that explores under which
conditions such variations have aggregate effects.2
A more recent branch of this literature investigates the aggregate impact of uncer-
tainty shocks beyond their transmission through investment and has also broadened the
sources of uncertainty studied. The first papers in this vein highlight non-linearities
in the New Keynesian model, in particular the role of precautionary price setting.3
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015), for example, look at a medium-scale DSGE model a`
la Smets and Wouters (2007). They find that at the zero lower bound output drops by
more than 1% after a two standard deviation shock to the volatility of taxes if a coun-
tervailing fiscal policy response is ruled out. Off the ZLB the drop reduces to 0.1%.4
In a similar framework, Basu and Bundick (2012) highlight the labor market response
to uncertainty about aggregate TFP and time preferences. They argue that, if uncer-
tainty increases, the representative household will want to save more and consume less.
Then, with King et al. (1988) preferences, the representative household will also supply
more labor, which in a New Keynesian model depresses output through a “paradox of
toil.” When labor supply increases, wages and hence marginal costs for firms fall. This
increases markups when prices are sticky, which finally depresses demand for consump-
tion and investment, and a recession follows. Overall, they find similar aggregate effects
as Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015), in particular at the zero-lower bound.
While our paper also focuses on precautionary savings, it differs substantially in
the transmission channel. We are agnostic about the importance of the “paradox of
toil,” because it crucially relies on a wealth effect in labor supply. We therefore assume
Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences to eliminate any direct impact of uncertainty on
labor supply to isolate the demand channel of precautionary savings instead.5 Moreover,
since we focus on idiosyncratic income uncertainty, we can identify the uncertainty
process outside the model from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
This focus on idiosyncratic uncertainty and the response of precautionary savings
links our paper to Ravn and Sterk (2013) and Den Haan et al. (2014). Both high-
light the importance of idiosyncratic unemployment risk. In their setups, households
face unemployment risk in an incomplete markets model with labor market search and
nominal frictions. Both papers differ in their asset market setup and the shocks con-
sidered. Ravn and Sterk (2013) look at a setup with government bonds as a means of
savings. They then study a joint shock to job separations and the share of long-term
2To name a few: Arellano et al. (2012), Bachmann and Bayer (2013), Christiano et al. (2010), Chugh
(2012), Gilchrist et al. (2014), Narita (2011), Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), Schaal (2012), and
Vavra (2014) have studied the business cycle implications of a time-varying dispersion of firm-specific
variables, often interpreted as and used to calibrate shocks to firm risk, propagated through various
frictions: wait-and-see effects from capital adjustment frictions, financial frictions, search frictions in
the labor market, nominal rigidities, and agency problems.
3With sticky prices, firms will target a higher markup the more uncertain future demand is.
4Born and Pfeifer (2014) report an output drop of 0.025% for a similar model and a similar policy
risk shock under a slightly different calibration. Regarding TFP risk they hardly find any aggregate
effect.
5Similarly, in a search model, higher uncertainty about match quality might translate into longer
search and more endogenous separation. Thus it is not clear a priori whether labor supply would
increase or decrease on impact.
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unemployed. This increases income risk and hence depresses aggregate demand because
of higher precautionary savings. They find that such first moment shocks to the labor
market can be significantly propagated and amplified through this mechanism.
Den Haan et al. (2014) consider a model with money and equity instead, where
equity is not physical capital as in our model, but is equated with vacancy-ownership.
In addition, they assume wage rigidity. As in our model, poorer households, in their
model the unemployed, are the marginal holders of money, the low-return asset, as they
effectively discount the future more. When unemployment goes up, demand for money
increases. This in turn leads to deflation, pushing up real wages because nominal wages
are assumed to be sticky. This has a second-round effect on money demand. Because the
labor intensity of production cannot be adjusted, higher real wages depress the equity
yield on existing and newly formed vacancies, which then induces portfolio adjustments
by households towards money amplifying the deflations and the related output drop.
Our transmission mechanism shares to some extent this feature, but additionally
highlights the importance of liquidity. Households increase their precautionary savings
in conjunction with a portfolio adjustment toward the liquid asset, because its services
in consumption smoothing become more valuable to households. We find that the
liquidity effect is more important than the relative return effect in our model where the
labor intensity of production can be adjusted.
Finally, our work relates to Gornemann et al. (2012). We discuss the distributional
consequences of uncertainty shocks and of systematic monetary policy response. We find
that both differently affect households that differ in their portfolios due to differential
asset price movements. This portfolio composition aspect is new in comparison to
Gornemann et al., because we introduce decisions regarding nominal versus real asset
holdings to the household’s problem.
3. Model
We model an economy inhabited by two types of agents: (worker-)households and en-
trepreneurs. Households supply capital and labor and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks
to their labor productivity. These shocks are persistent and have a time-varying vari-
ance. Households self-insure in a liquid nominal asset (money) and a less liquid physical
asset (capital). Liquidity of money is understood in the spirit of Kaplan and Violante’s
(2014) model of wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers, where households hold capital, but
trading capital is subject to a friction. We model this trading friction as limited partic-
ipation in the asset market. Every period, a fraction of households is randomly selected
to trade physical capital. All other households may only adjust their money holdings.6
While money is subject to an inflation tax and pays no dividend, capital can be rented
out to the intermediate-good-producing sector on a perfectly competitive rental market.
This sector combines labor and capital services into intermediate goods and sells them
to the entrepreneurs.
6We choose to exclude trading as a choice, and hence we use a simplified framework relative to
Kaplan and Violante (2014) for numerical tractability. Random participation keeps the households’
value function concave, thus making first-order conditions sufficient, and therefore allows us to use a
variant of the endogenous grid method as an algorithm for our numerical calculations. See Appendix
A for details.
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Entrepreneurs capture all pure rents in the economy. For simplicity, we assume that
entrepreneurs are risk neutral. They obtain rents from adjusting the aggregate capital
stock due to convex capital adjustment costs and, more importantly, from differentiating
the intermediate good. Facing monopolistic competition, they set prices above marginal
costs for these differentiated goods. Price setting, however, is subject to a pricing
friction a` la Calvo (1983) so that entrepreneurs may only adjust their prices with some
positive probability each period. The differentiated goods are finally bundled again to
the composite final good used for consumption and investment.
The model is closed by a monetary authority that provides money in positive net
supply and adjusts money growth according to the prescriptions of a Taylor type rule,
which reacts to inflation deviations from target. All seigniorage is wasted.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical households of measure one indexed by i.
Households are infinitely lived, have time-separable preferences with time-discount fac-
tor β, and derive felicity from consumption cit and leisure. They obtain income from
supplying labor and from renting out capital. A household’s labor income wthitnit is
composed of the wage rate, wt, hours worked, nit, and idiosyncratic labor productivity,
hit, which evolves according to the following AR(1)-process:
log hit = ρh log hit−1 + it, it ∼ N (0, σht) . (1.1)
Households have Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman (GHH) preferences and maximize the
discounted sum of felicity:
V = E0 max{cit,nit}
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cit − hitG(nit)) . (1.2)
The felicity function takes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form with risk aver-
sion ξ:
u(xit) =
1
1− ξ x
1−ξ
it , ξ > 0,
where xit = cit − hitG(nit) is household i’s composite demand for the bundled physical
consumption good cit and leisure. The former is obtained from bundling varieties j of
differentiated consumption goods according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
cit =
(∫
c
η−1
η
ijt dj
) η
η−1
.
Each of these differentiated goods is offered at price pjt so that the demand for each of
the varieties is given by
cijt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−η
cit,
where Pt =
(∫
p1−ηjt dj
) 1
1−η is the average price level.
The disutility of work, hitG(nit), determines a household’s labor supply given the
10
aggregate wage rate through the first-order condition:
hitG
′(nit) = wthit. (1.3)
We weight the disutility of work by hit to eliminate any Hartman-Abel effects of un-
certainty on labor supply. Under the above assumption, a household’s labor decision
does not respond to idiosyncratic productivity hit, but only to the aggregate wage wt.
Thus we can drop the household-specific index i, and set nit = Nt. Scaling the disutilty
of working by hit effectively sets the micro elasticity of labor supply to zero. There-
fore, it simplifies the calibration as we can calibrate the model to the income risk that
households face without the need to back out the actual productivity shocks. What is
more, without this assumption, higher realized uncertainty leads to higher productivity
inequality and hence increases aggregate labor supply.7
We assume a constant Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply with γ being the
inverse elasticity:
G(Nt) =
1
1 + γN
1+γ
t , γ > 0,
and use this to simplify the expression for the composite consumption good xit. Exploit-
ing the first-order condition on labor supply, the disutility of working can be expressed
in terms of the wage rate:
hitG(Nt) = hit
N1+γt
1 + γ =
hitG
′(Nt)Nt
1 + γ =
wthitNt
1 + γ .
In this way the demand for xit can be rewritten as:
xit = cit − hitG(Nt) = cit − wthitNt1 + γ .
Total labor input supplied is given by:
N˜t = Nt
∫
hitdi.
Following the literature on idiosyncratic income risk, we assume that asset markets
are incomplete. Households can only trade in nominal money, m˜it, that does not bear
any interest and in capital, kit, to smooth their consumption. Holdings of both assets
have to be non-negative. Moreover, trading capital is subject to a friction.
This trading friction allows only a randomly selected fraction of households, ν, to
participate in the asset market for capital every period. Only these households can
freely rebalance their portfolios. All other households obtain dividends, but may only
adjust their money holdings. For those households participating in the capital market,
7Without this assumption, nit increases in hit, and hence the aggregate effective labor supply,∫
hitnitdi, increases when the dispersion of hit increases. While it would not change the household’s
problem in its asset choices and the choice of xit, it would complicate aggregation.
11
the budget constraint reads:
cit +mit+1 + qtkit+1 =
mit
pit
+ (qt + rt)kit + wthitNt, mit+1, kit+1 ≥ 0,
where mit is real money holdings, kit is capital holdings, qt is the price of capital, rt is
the rental rate or “dividend,” and pit = PtPt−1 is the inflation rate. We denote real money
holdings of household i at the end of period t by mit+1 := m˜it+1Pt .
Substituting the expression cit = xit + wthitNt1+γ for consumption, we obtain:
xit +mit+1 + qtkit+1 =
mit
pit
+ (qt + rt)kit +
γ
1 + γwthitNt, mit+1, kit+1 ≥ 0. (1.4)
For those households that cannot trade in the market for capital the budget constraint
simplifies to:
xit +mit+1 =
mit
pit
+ rtkit +
γ
1 + γwthitNt, mit ≥ 0. (1.5)
Note that we assume that depreciation of capital is replaced through maintenance such
that the dividend, rt, is the net return on capital.
Since a household’s saving decision will be some non-linear function of that house-
hold’s wealth and productivity, the price level, Pt, and accordingly aggregate real money,
Mt+1 = M˜t+1Pt , will be functions of the joint distribution Θt of (mt, kt, ht). This makes Θt
a state variable of the household’s planning problem. This distribution evolves as a re-
sult of the economy’s reaction to shocks to uncertainty that we model as time variations
in the variance of idiosyncratic income shocks, σ2ht. This variance follows a stochastic
volatility process, which allows us to separate shocks to the variance from shocks to the
level of household income.
σ2ht = σ¯2 exp(st), st = ρsst−1 + εt, εt ∼ N
(
− σ2s2(1−ρ2s) , σs
)
, (1.6)
where σ¯2 is the steady state labor risk that households face, and s shifts this risk.
Shocks εt to income risk are the only aggregate shocks in our model.
With this setup, the dynamic planning problem of a household is then characterized
by two Bellman equations: Va in the case where the household can adjust its capital
holdings and Vn otherwise:
Va(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxk′,m′au[x(m,m
′
a, k, k
′, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′)] ,
Vn(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxm′nu[x(m,m
′
n, k, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′)] . (1.7)
In line with this notation, we define the optimal consumption policies for the ad-
justment and non-adjustment cases as x∗a and x∗n, the money holding policies as m∗a
and m∗n, and the capital investment policy as k∗. Details on the properties of the value
functions (smooth and concave) and policy functions (differentiable and increasing in
total resources), the first-order conditions, and the algorithm we employ to calculate
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the policy functions can be found in Appendix A.
3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate goods are produced with a constant returns to scale production function:
Yt = N˜αt K
(1−α)
t .
LetMCt be the relative price at which the intermediate good is sold to entrepreneurs.
The intermediate-good producer maximizes profits,
MCtYt = MCtN˜αt K
(1−α)
t − wtN˜t − (rt + δ)Kt,
but it operates in perfectly competitive markets, such that the real wage and the user
costs of capital are given by the marginal products of labor and capital:
wt = αMCt
(
Kt/N˜t
)1−α
, (1.8)
rt + δ = (1− α)MCt
(
N˜t/Kt
)α
. (1.9)
3.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs differentiate the intermediate good and set prices. They are risk neutral
and have the same discount factor as households. We assume that only the central
bank can issue money so that entrepreneurs participate in neither the money nor the
capital market. This assumption gives us tractability in the sense that it separates the
entrepreneurs’ price setting problem from the households’ saving problem. It enables
us to determine the price setting of entrepreneurs without having to take into account
households’ intertemporal decision making. Under these assumptions, the consumption
of entrepreneur j equals her current profits, Πjt. By setting the prices of final goods,
entrepreneurs maximize expected discounted future profits:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΠjt. (1.10)
Entrepreneurs buy the intermediate good at a price equalling the nominal marginal
costs, MCtPt, where MCt is the real marginal costs at which the intermediate good
is traded due to perfect competition, and then differentiate them without the need
of additional input factors. The goods that entrepreneurs produce come in varieties
uniformly distributed on the unit interval and each indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs
are monopolistic competitors, and hence charge a markup over their marginal costs.
They are, however, subject to a Calvo (1983) price setting friction, and can only update
their prices with probability θ. They maximize the expected value of future discounted
profits by setting today’s price, pjt, taking into account the price setting friction:
max
{pjt}
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEΠjt,t+s =
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEYjt,t+s(pjt −MCt+sPt+s) (1.11)
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s.t. : Yjt,t+s =
(
pjt
Pt+s
)−η
Yt+s,
where Πjt,t+s is the profits and Yjt,t+s is the production level in t+ s of a firm j that set
prices in t.
We obtain the following first-order condition with respect to pjt:
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEYjt,t+s
 p
∗
jt
Pt−1
− η
η − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
MCt+s
Pt+s
Pt−1
 = 0, (1.12)
where µ is the static optimal markup.
Recall that entrepreneurs are risk neutral and that they do not interact with house-
holds in any intertemporal trades. Moreover, aggregate shocks to the economy are small
and homoscedastic, since the only aggregate shock we consider is the shock to the vari-
ance of housdehold income shocks. Therefore, we can solve the entrepreneurs’ planning
problem locally by log-linearizing around the zero inflation steady state, without having
to know the solution of the households’ problem. This yields, after some tedious algebra
(see, e.g., Gal´ı, 2008), the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
log pit = βEt(log pit+1) + κ(logMCt + µ), (1.13)
where
κ = (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
.
We assume that besides differentiating goods and obtaining a rent from the markup
they charge, entrepreneurs also obtain and consume rents from adjusting the aggregate
capital stock. Since the dividend yield is below their time-preference rate, in equilib-
rium entrepreneurs never hold capital. The cost of adjusting the stock of capital is
φ
2
(
∆Kt+1
Kt
)2
Kt + ∆Kt+1. Hence, entrepreneurs will adjust the stock of capital until the
following first-order condition holds:8
qt = 1 + φ
∆Kt+1
Kt
. (1.14)
8Note that we assume capital adjustment costs only on new capital (or on the active destruction of
old capital) but not on the replacement of depreciation. Depreciated capital is assumed to be replaced
at the cost of one-to-one in consumption goods, and replacement is forced before the capital stock
is adjusted at a cost. This differential treatment of depreciation and net investment simplifies the
equilibrium conditions substantially, because the user cost of capital and hence the dividend paid to
households do not depend on the next period’s stock of capital, and the decisions of non-adjusters are
not influenced by the price of capital qt. Quantitatively, the fluctuations in dividends that maintenance
at price qt would bring about are negligible. Upon a 2 standard deviation shock to uncertainty, qt falls
to 0.96 – hence reducing depreciation cost by 4 basis points quarterly under the alternative specification
where maintenance comes at cost qt.
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3.4 Goods, Money, Capital, and Labor Market Clearing
The labor market clears at the competitive wage given in (1.8); so does the market for
capital services if (1.9) holds. We assume that the money supply is given by a monetary
policy rule that adjusts the growth rate of money in order to stabilize inflation:
Mt+1
Mt
= (θ1/pit)1+θ2
(
Mt
Mt−1
)θ3
(1.15)
Here Mt+1 is the real balances at the end of period t (with the timing aligned to our
notation for the households’ budget constraint). The coefficient θ1 ≥ 1 determines
steady-state inflation, and θ2 ≥ 0 the extent to which the central bank attempts to
stabilize inflation around its steady-state value: the larger θ2 the stronger is the reaction
of the central bank to deviations from the inflation target. When θ2 → ∞ inflation is
perfectly stabilized at its steady-state value. θ3 ≥ 0 captures persistence in money
growth. We assume that the central bank wastes any seigniorage buying final goods
and choose the above functional form for its simplicity.9
The money market clears whenever the following equation holds:
(θ1/pit)1+θ2
(
Mt
Mt−1
)θ3
Mt =
∫
[νm∗a(m, k, h; qt, pit) + (1− ν)m∗n(m, k, h; qt, pit)]
Θt(m, k, h)dmdkdh, (1.16)
with the end-of-period real money holdings of the preceding period given by
Mt :=
∫
mΘt(m, k, h)dmdkdh.
Last, the market for capital has to clear:
qt = 1 + φ
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
= 1 + νφK
∗
t+1 −Kt
Kt
, (1.17)
K∗t+1 :=
∫
k∗(m, k, h; qt, pit)Θt(m, k, h)dmdkdh,
Kt+1 = Kt + ν(K∗t+1 −Kt),
where the first equation stems from competition in the production of capital goods, the
second equation defines the aggregate supply of funds from households trading capital,
and the third equation defines the law of motion of aggregate capital. The goods market
9For the baseline calibration this is an innocuous assumption. With constant nominal money
growth, the changes in seigniorage are negligible in absolute terms. Steady-state seigniorage is .64%
of annual output, since money growth is 2% and the money-to-output ratio is 32%. When inflation
drops, say, from 2% to 0, the real value of seigniorage increases, but only from .64% to .66% of output.
As θ2 →∞, seigniorage occasionally turns slightly negative. It is numerically very expensive to put a
constraint on Mt, and hence we abstain from doing so to keep the dynamic problem tractable. This
unboundedness of seigniorage only affects the effectiveness of the stabilization policy. The central bank
can commit to decrease seigniorage more in the future without the requirement of (weakly) positive
seigniorage. One possible assumption to rationalize this is to assume that seigniorage is not wasted on
government consumption but is used to store goods in an inefficient way.
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then clears due to Walras’ law, whenever both money and capital markets clear.
3.5 Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in our model is a set of policy functions {x∗a, x∗n,m∗a,m∗n, k∗},
value functions {Va, Vn}, pricing functions {r, w, pi, q}, aggregate capital and labor sup-
ply functions {N,K}, distributions Θt over individual asset holdings and productivity,
and a perceived law of motion Γ, such that
1. Given {Va, Vn}, Γ, prices, and distributions, the policy functions {x∗a, x∗n,m∗a,m∗n, k∗}
solve the households’ planning problem, and given the policy functions, prices and
distributions, the value functions {Va, Vn} are a solution to the Bellman equations
(1.7).
2. The labor, the final-goods, the money, the capital, and the intermediate-good
markets clear, i.e., (1.8), (1.13), (1.16), and (1.17) hold.
3. The actual law of motion and the perceived law of motion Γ coincide, i.e., Θ′ =
Γ(Θ, s′).
4. Numerical Implementation
The dynamic program (1.7) and hence the recursive equilibrium is not computable,
because it involves the infinite dimensional object Θt.
4.1 Krusell-Smith Equilibrium
To turn this problem into a computable one, we assume that households predict future
prices only on the basis of a restricted set of moments, as in Krusell and Smith (1997,
1998). Specifically, we make the assumption that households condition their expecta-
tions only on last period’s aggregate real money holdings, Mt, last period’s aggregate
real money growth, ∆(logMt), the aggregate stock of capital, Kt, and the uncertainty
state, st. The reasoning behind this choice goes as follows: (1.16) determines inflation,
which in turn depends on the beginning of period money stock and last period’s money
growth. Once inflation is fixed, the Phillips curve (1.13) determines markups and hence
wages and dividends. These will pin down asset prices by making the marginal investor
indifferent between money and physical capital. If asset-demand functions, m∗a,n and
k∗, are sufficiently close to linear in human capital, h, and in non-human wealth, m, k,
at the mass of Θt, we can expect approximate aggregation to hold. For our exercise,
the four aggregate states – st, Mt, ∆(logMt), and Kt – are sufficient to describe the
evolution of the aggregate economy.10
While the law of motion for st is pinned down by (1.6), households use the following
log-linear forecasting rules for current inflation and the price of capital, where the
10Without persistence in money growth, Equation (1.16) does not depend on ∆(logMt) anymore
making it a redundant state. In this case, we set β4pi,q = 0.
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coefficients depend on the uncertainty state:
log pit = β1pi(st) + β2pi(st) logMt + β3pi(st) logKt + β4pi(st)∆(logMt), (1.18)
log qt = β1q (st) + β2q (st) logMt + β3q (st) logKt + β4q (st)∆(logMt). (1.19)
The law of motion for real money holdings, Mt, then follows from the monetary policy
rule and is given by:
logMt+1 = logMt + (1 + θ2)(log θ1 − log pit) + θ3∆(logMt).
The law of motion for Kt results from (1.17).
Fluctuations in q and pi happen for two reasons: As uncertainty goes up, the self-
insurance service that households receive from the illiquid capital good decreases. In
addition, the rental rate of capital falls as firms’ markups increase. When making their
investment decisions, households need to predict the next period’s capital price q′ to
determine the expected return on their investment. Since all other prices are known
functions of the markup, only pi′ and q′ need to be predicted.
Technically, finding the equilibrium is similar to Krusell and Smith (1997), as we
need to find market clearing prices within each period. Concretely, this means the
posited rules, (1.18) and (1.19), are used to solve for households’ policy functions.
Having solved for the policy functions conditional on the forecasting rules, we then
simulate n independent sequences of economies for t = 1, . . . , T periods, keeping track
of the actual distribution Θt. In each simulation the sequence of distributions starts
from the stationary distribution implied by our model without aggregate risk. We then
calculate in each period t the optimal policies for market clearing inflation rates and
capital prices assuming that households resort to the policy functions derived under rule
(1.18) and (1.19) from period t + 1 onward. Having determined the market clearing
prices, we obtain the next period’s distribution Θt+1. In doing so, we obtain n sequences
of equilibria. The first 250 observations of each simulation are discarded to minimize
the impact of the initial distribution. We next re-estimate the parameters of (1.18)
and (1.19) from the simulated data and update the parameters accordingly. By using
n = 20 and T = 750, it is possible to make use of parallel computing resources and
obtain 10.000 equilibrium observations. Subsequently, we recalculate policy functions
and iterate until convergence in the forecasting rules.
The posited rules (1.18) and (1.19) approximate the aggregate behavior of the econ-
omy fairly well. The minimal within sample R2 is above 99%. Also the out-of-sample
performance (see Den Haan, 2010)) of the forecasting rules is good. See Appendix D.
4.2 Solving the Household Planning Problem
In solving for the households’ policy functions we apply an endogenous gridpoint method
as originally developed in Carroll (2006) and extended by Hintermaier and Koeniger
(2010), iterating over the first-order conditions. We approximate the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity process by a discrete Markov chain with 17 states and time-varying transition
probabilities, using the method proposed by Tauchen (1986). The stochastic volatility
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process is approximated in the same vein using 7 states.11 Details on the algorithm can
be found in Appendix A.4.
5. Calibration
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. The behavior of the model in steady
state without fluctuations in uncertainty does not correspond to the time-averages of
the simulated variables in the model with uncertainty shocks. Hence we cannot use the
steady state to calibrate the model, but instead iterate over the full model to match
the calibration targets.12 The aggregate data used for calibration spans 1980 to 2012.
One period in the model refers to a quarter of a year. The choice of parameters as
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 is explained next. We present the parameters as if they
were individually changed in order to match a specific data moment, but all calibrated
parameters are determined jointly of course.
5.1 Income Process
We estimate the income process and hence uncertainty faced by households from in-
come data in the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), excluding the low-income sample. We construct household income
as pre-tax labor income plus private and public transfers minus all taxes, and control
for observable household characteristics in a first stage regression. We use the residual
income to estimate the parameters governing the idiosyncratic income process ρs, ρh, σ¯,
and σs.
In a first stage regression for log-income, we control nonparametrically for the ef-
fects of age, household size, and educational attainment and parametrically with up to
squared-order terms in age for the age-education interaction. We then generate vari-
ances and first and second order auto-covariances of residual income by age groups for
the years 1970-2009. Based on these age-year variances and covariances, the param-
eters of interests are estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM). We find
that the implied quarterly autocorrelation of the persistent component of income, ρh,
is 0.976 and the average standard deviation of quarterly persistent income shocks is
σ¯ = 0.078. The implied quarterly persistence of income risk, ρs, is 0.903 and thus in
line with business cycle frequencies. The annual coefficient of variation for income risk,
σs
σ¯
, is 0.62, which is consistent with the estimates in Storesletten et al. (2004).13 Table
1.1 summarizes the parameter estimates, where the values are adapted to the quarterly
frequency of our model. Details on data selection and the estimation procedure can be
found in Appendix B.
11We solve the household policies for 30 points on the grid for money and 50 points on the grid for
capital using equi-distant grids on log scale plus outliers. For aggregate money and capital holdings we
use a relatively coarse grid of 3 points each. We experimented with changing the number of gridpoints
without a noticeable impact on results. See Appendix D.
12As this is very expensive computational-wise, we match the target-ratios within +/- 1%.
13Storesletten et al. estimate the variance of persistent shocks to annual income to be 126% higher
in times of below average GDP growth than in times of above average GDP growth. This implies that
the unconditional annual coefficient of variation of s is roughly 0.5.
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Table 1.1: Estimated parameters of the income process
Parameter Value Description
ρh 0.976 Persistence of income
σ¯ 0.078 Average STD of innovations to income
ρs 0.903 Persistence of the income-innovation variance, σ2h
σs 0.277 Conditional STD (log scale) of σ2h
Notes: All values are adapted to the quarterly frequency of the model. For
details on the estimation see Appendix B.
5.2 Preferences and Technology
While we can estimate the income process directly from the data, all other parameters
are calibrated within the model. Table 1.2 summarizes our calibration. In detail, we
choose the parameter values as follows.
Households
For the felicity function, u = 11−ξx
1−ξ, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion
ξ = 4, as in Kaplan and Violante (2014). The time-discount factor, β, and the asset
market participation frequency, ν, are jointly calibrated to match the ratios of liquid
and illiquid assets to output. We equate illiquid assets to all capital goods at current
replacement values. This implies for the total value of illiquid assets relative to nominal
GDP a capital-to-output ratio of 286%. In our baseline calibration, this implies an
annual real return for illiquid assets of 3.2%. We equate liquid assets to claims of the
private sector against the government and not to inside money, because the net value of
inside claims does not change with inflation. Specifically, we look at average U.S. federal
debt for the years 1980 to 2012 held by domestic private agents plus the monetary base.
This yields an annual money-to-output ratio of 32%. For details on the steady-state
asset distribution, see Appendix C. The calibrated participation frequency ν = 4.25% is
close to Kaplan and Violante’s estimate for working households in their state-dependent
participation framework. We take a conservative value for the inverse Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, γ = 2, corresponding to the estimates by microeconometric studies.
We provide a robustness check with an estimate of the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, γ = 1, which follows the New Keynesian literature (Chetty et al. (2011)).
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Table 1.2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description Target
Households
β 0.987 Discount factor K/Y = 286% (annual)
ν 4.25% Participation frequency M/Y = 32% (annual)
ξ 4 Coefficient of rel. risk av. Kaplan and Violante (2014)
γ 2 Inverse of Frisch elasticity Standard value
Intermediate Goods
α 0.73 Share of labor Income share of labor of 2/3
δ 1.35% Depreciation rate NIPA: Fixed assets
Final Goods
κ 0.09 Price stickiness Mean price duration of 4 quarters
µ 0.10 Markup 10% markup (standard value)
Capital Goods
φ 220 Capital adjustment costs Relative investment volatility of 3
Monetary Policy (Friedman’s k% rule)
θ1 1.005 Money growth 2% p.a.
θ2 0 Reaction to inflation deviations
θ3 0 Persistence in money growth
Intermediate, Final, and Capital Goods Producers
We parameterize the production function of the intermediate good producer according
to the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). In the U.S. economy the
income share of labor is about 2/3. Accounting for profits we hence set α = 0.73.
To calibrate the parameters of the entrepreneurs’ problem, we use standard values for
markup and price stickiness that are widely employed in the New Keynesian literature.
The Phillips curve parameter κ implies an average price duration of 4 quarters, assuming
flexible capital at the firm level. The steady-state marginal costs, exp(−µ) = 0.91,
imply a markup of 10%. The entrepreneurs’ and households’ discount factor are equal.
We calibrate the adjustment cost of capital, φ = 220, to match an investment to
output volatility of 3.
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Table 1.3: Alternative monetary policy rules
Parameter Value Description Target
Inflation Stabilization
θ1 1.005 Money growth 2% p.a.
θ2 1000 Reaction to inflation deviations No deviations from target
θ3 0 Persistence in money growth
Fed Policy Rule (Post-1980)
θ1 1.005 Money growth 2% p.a.
θ2 0.35 Reaction to inflation deviations Chowdhury and Schabert (2008)
θ3 0.9 Persistence in money growth Chowdhury and Schabert (2008)
Notes: For the Fed policy rule as well as all robustness checks, we recalibrate the discount factor
and the participation frequency of households to match the targeted capital and money to output
ratios and the capital adjustment costs to match a relative investment volatility of 3.
Central Bank
We set the average growth rate of money, θ1, such that our model produces an average
annual inflation rate of 2%, in line with the usual inflation targets of central banks
and roughly equal to average inflation in the U.S. between 1980 and 2012. To simplify
the dynamics of the model and for expositional purpose, we assume in our baseline
setup that the central bank follows Friedman’s k% rule and hence set θ2 and θ3 to
0. Alternatively, we consider two additional policy rules, see Table 1.3. First, we set
θ2 = 1000 and θ3 = 0, to examine uncertainty shocks without movements in the price
level. Second, we calibrate towards the post-1980s money supply rule of the Federal
Reserve as estimated in Chowdhury and Schabert (2008) to quantify the contribution
of uncertainty shocks to the U.S. business cycle over this period. This implies θ2 = 0.35
and θ3 = 0.9.14
6. Quantitative Results
6.1 Household Portfolios and the Individual Response to Uncertainty
In our model, households hold money because it provides better short-term consumption
smoothing than capital, as the latter can only be traded infrequently. This value of
14Originally, Chowdhury and Schabert report Taylor rules for money including a reaction to the
output gap. We obtain θ2 = 0.35 by using the Phillips curve from our model to eliminate the output
gap.
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Figure 1.2: Share of liquid assets in total net worth against percentiles of wealth
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Notes: For graphical illustration we make use of an Epanechnikov Kernel-
weighted local linear smoother with bandwidth 0.15. For the definition of
net liquid assets see Figure 1.1.
liquidity decreases in the amount of money a household holds, because a household rich
in liquid assets will likely be able to tap into its illiquid wealth before running down
all liquid wealth. For this reason, richer households, who typically hold both more
money and more capital, hold less liquid portfolios. The poorest households, on the
contrary, hold almost all their wealth in the liquid asset. This holds true in the actual
data as well as in our model. While our model matches relatively well the shape of
the actual liquidity share of household portfolios at all wealth percentiles, it slightly
underestimates the share of liquid assets for the lowest deciles; see Figure 1.2, which
compares our model to the Survey of Consumer Finances 2004.
So what happens to total savings and its composition when uncertainty increases?
In response to the increase in income uncertainty, households aim for higher precau-
tionary savings to be in a better position to smooth their consumption. Since the liquid
asset is better suited to this purpose, households first increase their demand for this
asset – in fact, they even reduce holdings of the illiquid asset to increase the liquidity of
their portfolio. Figure 1.3 shows how households’ portfolio composition and consump-
tion policy react to an increase in uncertainty without imposing any market clearing.
The top panels displays the relative change in the consumption and portfolio liquidity
compared to the average uncertainty state. For this exercise, we evaluate households’
consumption policies and the portfolio choice of adjusters and non-adjusters after a 2
standard deviation shock to uncertainty, increasing the variance of idiosyncratic income
shocks by 55%. We here perform a partial equilibrium analysis and compute the policies
under the expectation that all prices are at their steady-state values isolating hence the
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Figure 1.3: Partial equilibrium response – Change in individual policy upon an uncer-
tainty shock keeping prices and expectations constant at steady-state values
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Notes: Top Panels: Reaction of individual consumption demand and portfolio liquidity of
adjusters and non-adjusters at constant prices and price expectations relative to the respec-
tive counterpart at average uncertainty. The policies are averaged using frequency weights
from the steady-state wealth distribution and reported conditional on a household falling
into the x-th wealth percentile. High uncertainty corresponds to a two standard deviation
shock, which is equal to a 55% increase in uncertainty.
Bottom Panels: Fraction of total demand change for money and capital accounted for by all
households in a given percentile of the wealth dristribution.
As with the data, we use an Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear smoother with band-
width 0.15.
direct effect of income uncertainty. Across all wealth levels, households wish to increase
their savings (i.e., decrease their consumption) as well as the liquidity of their portfolios
when uncertainty goes up. Adjusters can do so by tipping into their capital account
and thus their consumption falls less. This flight to liquidity leads to falling demand
for capital even though total savings increase.
The bottom panels of Figure 1.3 display the contribution of each wealth percentile
to the total change in demand for money and capital. Values above (below) one imply
that a certain percentile of the wealth distribution is contributing more (less) than
proportionally. We find that almost all wealth groups are equally important for the
change in total asset demand. In other words, poorer households, while making up a
smaller fraction of total asset demand, observe larger changes in their asset positions
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Figure 1.4: General equilibrium response – Change in the liquidity of household port-
folios
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Notes: Change in the distribution of liquidity at all percentiles of the wealth distribution
at equilibrium prices and price expectations for s = {1, 8} quarters after a two standard
deviation shock to income uncertainty. The liquidity of the portfolios is averaged using
frequency weights from the steady-state wealth distribution and reported conditional on
a household falling into the x-th wealth percentile. The left-hand panel shows the change
including changes in prices; the right-hand panel shows the pure quantity responses.
As with the data, we use an Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear smoother with
bandwidth 0.15.
and hence are as important as richer households for the aggregate demand changes.
The change in the liquidity of household portfolios in general equilibrium is displayed
in Figure 1.4; the left-hand panel shows the change in value terms; the right-hand panel
shows the change in quantities, i.e., at constant prices. Portfolio liquidity initially
increases at all wealth levels – in particular in value terms because the price of illiquid
assets drops sharply as we will see in the next section. The increase in the share of
liquid assets is least pronounced for the poorest, because of the negative income effect.
After two years, the increase in liquidity is concentrated at households somewhat below
median wealth. By then, rich households have partially reversed their portfolio shares
as they also increase their savings in physical capital, exploiting lower capital prices.
Interestingly, this picture is exactly what we found in Figure 1.1, where the increase in
the liquidity of the portfolios is strongest for the lower middle class. Only the magnitude
of changes in the liquidity of household portfolios during the Great Recession is much
more dramatic.
6.2 Aggregate Consequences of Uncertainty Shocks
Main Findings
This simultaneous decrease in the demand for consumption and capital upon an increase
in uncertainty leads to a decline in output. Figure 1.5 displays the impulse responses of
output and its components, real balances and the capital stock as well as asset prices
and returns for our baseline calibration. The assumed monetary policy follows a strict
money growth rule, i.e., it is not responsive to inflation. After a two standard deviation
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Figure 1.5: Uncertainty shock under constant money growth
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
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increase in the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, output drops on impact
by 0.5% and only returns to the normal growth path after roughly 20 quarters. Over
the first year the output drop is 0.37% on average.
The output drop in our model results from households increasing their precautionary
savings in conjunction with a portfolio adjustment toward the liquid asset. In times
of high uncertainty, households dislike illiquid assets because of their limited use for
short-run consumption smoothing. Conversely, the price of capital decreases on impact
by 4%. Since the demand for the liquid asset is a demand for paper and not for
(investment) goods, demand for both consumption and investment goods falls.
This decrease in demand puts pressure on prices. Inflation falls by 65 basis points
on impact, increasing the average markup in the economy. Thus, the marginal return
on capital, rt, and consequently investment demand decline, while the return on money
goes up. Thereby, the flight to liquidity increases the relative return of money, which
further amplifies the portfolio adjustment. In line with the excess stock volatility puzzle,
uncertainty shocks move capital prices and expected returns much more (and in the
opposite direction) than they move dividends (65 vs. -4 basis points, quarterly).
Stabilization Policy
How much of this is driven by the increased value of liquidity, and how much by the
differential impact of disinflation on the return of money and on dividends? We can
isolate the flight to liquidity from the effect of the change in relative returns by looking at
a monetary policy that is stabilizing the economy – setting θ2 = 1000, θ3 = 0. Under this
policy, inflation is fixed and output barely moves. Also dividends are virtually constant.
Thus, the relative-return effect vanishes in the case of strict inflation targeting. The
corresponding impulse responses are displayed in Figure 1.6. As a consequence of the
stabilization, the price of capital falls less, but it still falls by more than 2%. The
expected return on capital increases by about 50 basis points. The total income of
households almost stays constant in the first 5 years and hence money demand peaks
at an even higher level than without stabilization.
In other words, the portfolio adjustment is to a large extent driven by a flight
to liquidity. After roughly 2.5 years, real balances have increased to a point where
households are well insured and want to increase their holdings of the illiquid asset
again.
Quantitative Importance: Fed Policy Rule
Figure 1.7 displays the aggregate consequences of shocks to household income risk using
the Fed’s post-1980’s money supply reaction function as estimated by Chowdhury and
Schabert (2008). The results are roughly half way between perfect stabilization and
constant money growth.
How Important Is the (Il)liquidity of Capital?
Our calibration suggests that households can adjust their capital holdings on average
every 23.5 quarters. This restricted access to savings in capital limits its use for short-
run consumption smoothing considerably. If capital were easier to access, it would
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Figure 1.6: Uncertainty shock under inflation stabilization
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
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Figure 1.7: Uncertainty shock under Fed’s post-80’s reaction function as estimated in
Chowdhury and Schabert (2008)
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
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Figure 1.8: Uncertainty shock with liquid capital (ν = 35%)
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
become more and more of a substitute for money in terms of its use for consumption
smoothing. Hence, aggregate money holdings decline as ν increases. Figure 1.8 plots the
impulse responses for an average adjustment frequency of less than a year (ν = 35%). In
this case money holdings are only 8.5% of annual output on average, which corresponds
to the U.S. monetary base.15
Figure 1.8 shows that the output drop is very similar with a higher portfolio adjust-
ment frequency, although the share of money in the economy is significantly smaller
and capital is very liquid in comparison to the baseline calibration. Money demand
reacts more elastically to uncertainty as more households are able to adjust their port-
folio. Consequently, the flight to liquidity is stronger and happens faster than with
more illiquid capital – in the build-up and in the reverse.
15We use the St. Louis Fed adjusted annual monetary base from 1980 to 2012.
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In summary, the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks are robust to changes
in ν. While in the limit with perfectly liquid capital money is driven out of the economy,
the economy seems to not converge toward the “Aiyagari” economy without money and
perfectly liquid capital. In the “Aiyagari” case, investment replaces consumption de-
mand one-for-one when uncertainty hits. As long as households hold even tiny amounts
of money for liquidity-consumption smoothing reasons, the value of money increases
with income uncertainty and money demand is higher in uncertain times, which creates
deflationary pressures.
In other words, and more generally speaking, uncertainty shocks will affect aggregate
demand negatively only if they trigger precautionary savings in paper and not in real
assets. In our model, it is the increased value of liquidity that is responsible for the
portfolio adjustment toward money.
6.3 Redistributive and Welfare Effects
So far we have described the aggregate dimension of an uncertainty shock and its
repercussions. Since such shocks affect the price level, asset prices, dividends, and
wages differently, our model predicts that not all agents (equally) lose from the decline
in consumption upon an uncertainty shock. For example, if capital prices fall, those
agents that are rich in human capital but hold little physical capital could actually gain
from the uncertainty shock. These agents are net savers. They increase their holdings
of physical capital and can do so now more cheaply.
To quantify and understand the relative welfare consequences of the uncertainty
shock and of systematic policy response, one would normally just look at the change
in a household’s value function. However, since solving directly for the value function
is prohibitively time consuming in our model, we instead simulate and compare two
sets of economies: one where the uncertainty state simply evolves according to its
Markov chain properties and another set where, at time T , we exogenously increase
income uncertainty, σ2ht, by setting the shock to uncertainty to T = 2σs, a 2 standard
deviation increase. We then let the economies evolve stochastically. We trace agents
over the next S periods for both sets of economies, and track their period-felicity uiT+t
to calculate for each agent with individual state (h,m, k) in period T the discounted
expected felicity stream over the next S periods as:
vS(h,m, k) = E
[
S∑
t=0
βtuT+t
∣∣∣∣∣(hT ,mT , kT ) = (h,m, k)
]
,
where uT+t is the felicity stream in period T + t under the household’s optimal saving
policy. For large S, vS approximates the actual household’s value function.
We then determine an equivalent consumption tax that households would be willing
to face over the next S quarters in order to eliminate the uncertainty shock at time T
as:
CE =
(
vshockS
vno shockS
)1/(1−ξ)
− 1. (1.20)
Figure 1.9 displays the relative differences in vS for S = 20 quarters in terms of
consumption equivalents, CE, between the two sets of simulations of the economy. This
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Figure 1.9: Welfare after 5 years
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Table 1.4: Welfare after 5 years
Policy regime: Constant money growth
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.92 -0.73 -0.55 -0.38 -0.18 -0.53 -0.47 -0.51 -0.55 -0.61
Median -0.96 -0.78 -0.57 -0.35 -0.02 -0.63 -0.59 -0.61 -0.64 -0.69
Quintiles of Human Capital
Conditional -0.62 -0.62 -0.58 -0.45 -0.43
Median -0.59 -0.61 -0.60 -0.52 -0.58
Policy regime: Inflation stabilization
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.21 -0.39 -0.39 -0.35 -0.31 -0.43 -0.36 -0.32 -0.29 -0.25
Median -0.41 -0.42 -0.37 -0.29 -0.14 -0.57 -0.45 -0.37 -0.31 -0.20
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional -0.08 -0.22 -0.35 -0.40 -0.53
Median -0.09 -0.22 -0.39 -0.45 -0.62
Policy regime: Fed reaction function
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.56 -0.55 -0.47 -0.36 -0.26 -0.48 -0.42 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43
Median -0.71 -0.61 -0.47 -0.32 -0.09 -0.60 -0.52 -0.50 -0.47 -0.45
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional -0.34 -0.42 -0.46 -0.42 -0.48
Median -0.32 -0.42 -0.49 -0.48 -0.60
Notes: Welfare costs in terms of consumption equivalents (CE) as defined in (1.20).
Conditional refers to integrating out the missing dimensions, whereas Median refers to
median asset holdings of the respective other assets. We track households over 20 quarters
and average over 100 independent model simulations.
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time horizon captures the welfare consequences of the recession following the uncertainty
shock. See Appendix E for an assessment of welfare after more than 75 years, when the
initial position, (hT ,mT , kT ), has washed out in the sense that the conditional and the
unconditional distributions are almost identical. Of course, in the long run there are
no differences between the two sets of economies.
On average, households would be willing to forgo roughly 0.41% of their consumption
over 5 years to eliminate the uncertainty shock. This average loss masks heterogeneous
effects across households with different asset positions and human capital. While mone-
tary policy can reduce the cost to roughly 0.25% on average, it also shifts the burden of
the shock between households. Figure 1.9 displays the expected welfare costs of house-
holds conditioning on two of the three dimensions of the (h,m, k)-space – integrating
out the missing dimension.
Without stabilization, money rich and physical asset poor households lose the least.
These are households that typically acquire physical capital in exchange for their money
holdings, and they can do so at favorable capital prices after the uncertainty shock. For
a similar reason, the steepness of the gradient in human capital is relatively modest.
After the shock, human capital rich households suffer from lower wages, but as savers
they are partly compensated, because they can acquire physical capital at lower prices.
Table 1.4 summarizes the figures numerically. In this table, we condition on just one
dimension of the households’ portfolio, and display the average relative welfare gains.
We do so in two ways: First, we calculate welfare conditional on one asset taking the
conditional distribution of the other two assets into account. Second, we also report
welfare effects at median asset holdings of the respective other assets. The latter isolates
the direct effect in the dimension of interest.
Table 1.4 and Figure 1.9 shows that the intervention of the central bank helps
households with high amounts of physical assets. In particular wealthy agents with
low human capital profit the most from stabilization. Conversely, the capital poor but
human-capital rich households profit the least from stabilization, because it is them who
finance the increased money supply and they comparatively suffer from stable prices
for the physical asset.
7. Conclusion
This paper examines how variations in uncertainty about household income affect the
macroeconomy through precautionary savings. For this purpose we develop a novel
and tractable framework that combines nominal rigidities and incomplete markets in
which households choose portfolios of liquid paper and illiquid physical assets – merg-
ing incomplete markets with wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers and New Keynesian
modeling. In this model, higher uncertainty about income triggers a flight to liquid-
ity because it is superior for short-run consumption smoothing. This reduces not only
consumption but also investment and hence depresses economic activity.
Calibrating the model to match the evolution of uncertainty about household income
in the U.S., we find that a spike in income uncertainty can lead to substantive output,
consumption, and investment losses. This may help us to understand the slow recovery
of the U.S. economy during the Great Recession, for which we document a shift toward
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liquid assets across all percentiles of the U.S. wealth distribution. We find that a two
standard deviation increase in household income uncertainty generates output losses
that are sizable.
The welfare effects of such uncertainty shocks crucially depend on a household’s
asset position and the stance of monetary policy. Monetary policy that drastically
increases the money supply in times of increased uncertainty limits the negative welfare
effects of uncertainty shocks but redistributes from the asset poor to the asset rich.
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Appendices
A. Dynamic Planning Problem with Two Assets
The dynamic planning problem of a household in the model is characterized by two
Bellman equations, Va in the case where the household can adjust its capital holdings
and Vn otherwise
Va(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxk′,m′a∈Γau[x(m,m
′
a, k, k
′, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′)]
Vn(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxm′n∈Γnu[x(m,m
′
n, k, k, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′)] (1.21)
where the budget sets are given by
Γa(m, k, h; Θ, s) = {m′, k′ ≥ 0|q(Θ, s)(k′ − k) +m′ ≤ γ1 + γw(Θ, s)hN + r(Θ, s)k +
m
pi(Θ, s)}
(1.22)
Γn(m, k, h; Θ, s) = {m′ ≥ 0|m′ ≤ γ1 + γw(Θ, s)hN + r(Θ, s)k +
m
pi(Θ, s)} (1.23)
x(m,m′, k, k′, h) = γ1 + γw(Θ, s)hN + r(Θ, s)k +
m
pi(Θ, s) − q(Θ, s)(k
′ − k)−m′
(1.24)
To save on notation, let Ω be the set of possible idiosyncratic state variables controlled
by the household, let Z be the set of potential aggregate states, let Γi : Ω→ Ω be the
correspondence describing the feasibility constraints, and let Ai(z) = {(ω, y) ∈ Ω× Ω :
y ∈ Γi(ω, z)} be the graph of Γi. Hence the states and controls of the household problem
can be defined as
Ω ={ω = (m, k) ∈ R2+ : m, k ≤ ∞} (1.25)
z ={h,Θ, s} (1.26)
and the return function F : A→ R reads:
F (Γi(ω, z), ω; z) =
x1−γi
1− γ (1.27)
Define the value before the adjustment/non-adjustment shock realizes as
v(ω, z) := νVa(ω, z) + (1− ν)Vn(ω, z).
Now we can rewrite the optimization problem of the household in terms of the
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definitions above in a compact form:
Va(ω, z) = max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)] (1.28)
Vn(ω, z) = max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)]. (1.29)
Finally we define the mapping T : C(Ω) → C(Ω), where C(Ω) is the space of
bounded, continuous and weakly concave functions.
(Tv)(ω, z) = νVa(ω, z) + (1− ν)Vn(ω, z) (1.30)
Va(ω, z) = max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)]
Vn(ω, z) = max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)].
A.1 Properties of Primitives
The following properties of the primitives of the problem obviously hold:
P 1. Properties of sets Ω,Γa(ω, z),Γn(ω, z)
1. Ω is a convex subset of R3.
2. Γi(·, z) : Ω→ Ω is non-empty, compact-valued, continuous, monotone and convex
for all z.
P 2. Properties of return function F
F is bounded, continuous, strongly concave, C2 differentiable on the interior of A,
and strictly increasing in each of its first two arguments.
A.2 Properties of the Value and Policy Functions
Lemma 1. The mapping T defined by the Bellman equation for v fulfills Blackwell’s
sufficient conditions for a contraction on the set of bounded, continuous and weakly
concave functions C(Ω).
a) It satisfies discounting.
b) It is monotonic.
c) It preserves boundedness (assuming an arbitrary maximum consumption level).
d) It preserves strict concavity.
Hence, the solution to the Bellman equation is strictly concave. The policy is a single-
valued function in (m, k), and so is optimal consumption.
Proof. The proof proceeds item by item and closely follows Nancy L. Stokey (1989)
taking into account that the household problem in the extended model consists of two
Bellman equations.
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a) Discounting
Let a ∈ R+ and the rest be defined as above. Then it holds that:
(T (v + a))(ω, z) =ν max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEv(y, z′) + a]
+ (1− ν) max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEv(y, z′) + a]
=(Tv)(ω, z) + βwa
Accordingly, T fulfills discounting.
b) Monotonicity
Let g : Ω× Z → R2, f : Ω× Z → R2 and g(ω, z) ≥ f(ω, z) ∀ω, z ∈ Ω× Z, then
it follows that:
(Tg)(ω, z) =ν max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEg(y, z′)]
+ (1− ν) max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEg(y, z′)]
≥ν max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEf(y, z′)]
+ (1− ν) max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEf(y, z′)]
=Tf(ω, z)
The objective function for which Tg is the maximized value is uniformly higher
than the function for which Tf is the maximized value. Therefore, T preserves
monotonicity.
c) Boundedness
From properties P1 it follows that the mapping T defines a maximization prob-
lem over the continuous and bounded function [F (ω, y) + βwEv(y, z′))] over the
compact sets Γi(ω, z) for i = {a, n}. Hence the maximum is attained. Since F
and v are bounded, Tv is also bounded.
d) Strict Concavity
Let f ∈ C ′′(Ω), where C ′′ is the set of bounded, continuous, strictly concave
functions on Ω. Since the convex combination of two strictly concave functions
is strictly concave, it is sufficient to show that Ti[C ′′(Ω)] ⊆ C ′′(Ω), where Ti is
defined by
Tiv = max
y∈Γi(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEv(y, z′)], i ∈ {a, n}
Let ω0 6= ω1, θ ∈ (0, 1), ωθ = θω0 + (1− θ)ω1.
Let yj ∈ Γi(ωj, z) be the maximizer of (Tif)(ωj) for j = {0, 1} and i = {a, n},
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yθ = θy0 + (1− θ)y1.
(Tif)(ωθ, z) ≥[F (ωθ, yθ, z) + βwEf(yθ, z′)]
>θ[F (ω0, y0, z) + βwEf(y0, z′))] + (1− θ)[F (ω1, y1, z) + βwEf(y1, z′)]
=θ(Tf)(ω0, z) + (1− θ)(Tf)(ω1, z)
The first inequality follows from yθ being feasible because of convex budget sets.
The second inequality follows from the strict concavity of f . Since ω0 and ω1
are arbitrary, it follows that Tif is strictly concave, and since f is arbitrary that
T [C ′′(Ω)] ⊆ C ′′(Ω).
Lemma 2. The value function is C2 and the policy function C1 differentiable.
Proof. The properties of the choice set P1, of the return function P2, and the properties
of the value function proven in (1) fulfill the assumptions of Santos’s (1991) theorem on
the differentiability of the policy function. According to the theorem, the value function
is C2 and the policy function C1 differentiable.
Note that strong concavity of the return function holds for CRRA utility, because of
the arbitrary maximum we set for consumption.
Lemma 3. The total savings S∗i := m∗i (ω, z) + q(z)k∗i (ω, z) and consumption c∗i , i ∈
{a, n} are increasing in ω if r(z) is positive. In the adjustment case total savings and
consumption are increasing in total resources Ra = [q(z)+r(z)]k+m/pi(z) for any r(z).
Proof. Define v˜(S, z) := max{m,k|m+q(z)k≤S}Ev(m, k; z′) and resources in the case of no
adjustment Rn = r(z)k +m/pi(z). Since v is strictly concave and increasing, so is v˜ by
the line of the proof of Lemma 1.d). Now we can (re)write the planning problem as
Va(m, k; z) = max
S≤ γ1+γw(z)hN+Ra
[u( γ1 + γw(z)hN + [q(z) + r(z)]k +m/pi(z)− S) + βW v˜(S, z)]
Vn(m, k; z) = max
m′≤ γ1+γw(z)hN+Rn
[u( γ1 + γw(z)hN + r(z)k +m/pi(z)−m
′) + βWEv(m′, k; z′)].
Due to differentiability we obtain the following (sufficient) first-order conditions:
∂u
(
γ
1+γw(z)hN + [q(z) + r(z)]k +m/pi(z)− S
)
∂c
= βW
∂v˜(S, z)
∂S
∂u
(
γ
1+γw(z)hN + r(z)k +m/pi(z)−m′
)
∂c
= βW
∂v(m′, k; z)
∂m′
. (1.31)
Since the left-hand sides are decreasing in ω = (m, k), and increasing in S (respectively
m′), and the right-hand side is decreasing in S (respectivelym′), S∗i =
{
qk′ +m′ if i = a
qk +m′ if i = n
must be increasing in ω.
Since the right-hand side of (1.31) is hence decreasing in ω, so must be the left-hand
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side of (1.31). Hence consumption must be increasing in ω.
The last statement follows directly from the same proof.
A.3 Euler Equations
Denote the optimal policies for consumption, for money holdings and capital as x∗i ,m∗i , k∗, i ∈
{a, n} respectively. The first-order conditions for an inner solution in the (non-)adjustment
case read:
k∗ :∂u(x
∗
a)
∂x
q =βE
[
ν
∂Va(m∗a, k∗; z′)
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(m
′
a, k
′; z′)
∂k
]
(1.32)
m∗a :
∂u(x∗a)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(m∗a, k∗; z′)
∂m
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(m
∗
a, k
∗; z′)
∂m
]
(1.33)
m∗n :
∂u(x∗n)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(m∗n, k; z′)
∂m
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(m
∗
n, k; z′)
∂m
]
(1.34)
Note the subtle difference between (1.33) and (1.34), which lies in the different capital
stocks k′ vs. k in the right-hand side expressions.
Differentiating the value functions with respect to k and m, we obtain:
∂Va(m, k; z)
∂k
= ∂u[x
∗
a(m, k; z)]
∂x
(q(z) + r(z)) (1.35)
∂Va(m, k; z)
∂m
= ∂u[x
∗
a(m, k; z)]
∂x
pi(z)−1 (1.36)
∂Vn(m, k; z)
∂m
= ∂u[x
∗
n(m, k; z)]
∂x
pi(z)−1 (1.37)
∂Vn(m, k; z)
∂k
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(m, k; z)]
∂x
(1.38)
+ βE
[
ν
∂Va[m∗n(m, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂V
n[m∗n(m, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
]
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(m, k; z)]
∂x
+ βνE∂u{x
∗
a[m∗n(m, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂x
(q(z′) + r(z′))
+ β(1− ν)E∂Vn{[m
∗
n(m, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂k
such that the marginal value of capital in non-adjustment is defined recursively.
Now we can plug the second set of equations into the first set of equations and
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obtain the following Euler equations (in slightly shortened notation):
∂u[x∗a(m, k; z)]
∂x
q(z) =βE
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(m∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)] + (1− ν)∂V
n(m∗a, k′; z′)
∂k′
]
(1.39)
∂u[x∗a(m, k; z)]
∂x
=βEpi′(z′)−1
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(m∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(m∗a, k′; z′)]
∂x
]
(1.40)
∂u[x∗n(m, k, ; z)]
∂x
=βEpi′(z′)−1
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(m′n, k; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(m∗n, k; z′)]
∂x
]
(1.41)
A.4 Algorithm
The algorithm we use to solve for optimal policies given the Krusell-Smith forecasting
rules is a version of Hintermaier and Koeniger’s (2010) extension of the endogenous grid
method, originally developed by Carroll (2006).
It works iteratively until convergence of policies as follows: Start with some guess
for the policy functions x∗a and x∗n on a given grid (m, k) ∈M ×K. Define the shadow
value of capital
β−1ψ(m, k; z) :=νE
{
∂u{x∗a[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]}
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)]
}
(1.42)
+ (1− ν)E∂Vn[m
∗
n(m, k, z), k; z′]
∂k
= νE
{
∂u{x∗a[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]}
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)]
}
+ (1− ν)E
{
∂u{x∗n(m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′)]
∂x
r(z′)
}
+ (1− ν)E {ψ[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]} .
Guess initially ψ = 0. Then
1. Solve for an update of x∗n by standard endogenous grid methods using equation
(1.41), and denote m∗n(m, k; z) as the optimal money holdings without capital
adjustment.
2. Find for every k′ on-grid some (off-grid) value of m˜∗a(k′; z) such that combining
(1.40) and (1.39) yields:
0 = νE
{
∂u[x∗a(m˜∗a(k′, z), k′; z′)]
∂x
[
q(z′) + r(z′)
q(z) − pi(z
′)−1
]}
(1.43)
+ (1− ν)E
{
∂u[x∗n(m˜∗a(k′, z), k′; z′)]
∂x
[
r(z′)
q(z) − pi(z
′)−1
]}
+ (1− ν)E
[
ψ(m˜∗a(k′, z), k′; z′)
q(z)
]
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N.B. that Eψ takes the stochastic transitions in h′ into account and does not
replace the expectations operator in the definition of ψ. If no solution exists,
set m˜∗a = 0. Uniqueness (conditional on existence) of m˜∗a follows from the strict
concavity of v.
3. Solve for total initial resources, by solving the Euler equation (1.40) for x˜∗(k′, z),
such that:
x˜∗(k′, z)
= ∂u
∂x
−1 {
βEpi(z′)−1
[
ν
∂u{x∗a[m∗a(k′, z), k′; z′]}
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u{x
∗
n[m∗a(k′, z), k′; z′]
∂x
]}
(1.44)
where the right-hand side expressions are obtained by interpolating x∗a(m∗a(k′, z), k′, z′)
from the on-grid guesses x∗a(m, k; z) and taking expected values with respect to
z′.
This way we obtain total non-human resources R˜a(k′, z) that are compatible with
plans (m∗(k′), k′) and a consumption policy ˜˜x∗a(R˜a(k′, z), z) in total resources.
4. Since (consumption) policies are increasing in resources, we can obtain consump-
tion policy updates as follows: Calculate total resources for each (m, k) pair
Ra(m, k) = (q+r)k+m/pi and use the consumption policy obtained before to up-
date x∗a(m, k, z) by interpolating atRa(m, k) from the set
{
(˜˜x∗a(R˜a(k′, z), z), Ra(k′, z))
∣∣∣k′ ∈ K}.16
5. Update ψ: Calculate a new value of ψ using (1.38), such that:
ψnew(m, k, z) =βνE
{
∂u{x∗a[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]}
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)]
}
+ β(1− ν)E
{
∂u{x∗n(m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′)]
∂x
r(z′)
}
+ β(1− ν)E
{
ψold[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]
}
. (1.45)
making use of the updated consumption policies.
B. Estimation of the Stochastic Volatility Process for
Household Income
B.1 Income Process
We assume that the observed log-income of a household, yi,a,t, is composed of four
components: a deterministic part f(oi,a,t), a transitory part τi,a,t, a persistent part
16If a boundary solution m˜∗(0) > 0 is found, we use the “n” problem to obtain consumption policies
for resources below m˜∗(0).
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hi,a,t, and a permanent part µi such that:
yi,a,t = f(oi,a,t) + y∗i,a,t, (1.46)
y∗i,a,t = τi,a,t + hi,a,t + µi, (1.47)
hi,a,t = ρhhi,a−1,t−1 + i,a,t, (1.48)
where oi,a,t is observable characteristics of the household’s head, y∗i,a,t is the stochastic
component of a household’s income (“residual income”), t is calendar time, and a is
the household’s years of labor market experience. We assume that all households start
with hi,0,t = 0 when they enter the labor market.
For the shocks i,a,t to the persistent part h we assume them to be Gaussian, i,a,t ∼
N(0, σ,2t ), with a time-varying variance that follows an AR(1) process (in logs) plus
quadratic trend.
log σ,2t = (1− ρs)µs + ξ1t+ ξ2t2 + ρs log σ,2t−1 + εt, (1.49)
εt ∼ N(0, σ2s). (1.50)
For the variances of the fixed effect µi we assume them to be cohort specific, such
that µi ∼ N(0, σµ,2t−a), where t − a denotes the birth cohort. We assume the transitory
component, τi,a,t ∼ N(0, σ2τ ), to have a constant variance.
Income Variances
Under the above assumptions, the variance of residual income, y∗i,a,t, is given by
σy,2a,t = σ2τ + σ2µ,t−a + σ
h,2
a,t , (1.51)
σh,2a,t = ρ2hσ
h,2
a−1,t−1 + σ,2t ; σh,20,t = 0, (1.52)
log σ,2t = (1− ρs)µs + ξ1t+ ξ2t2 + ρs log σ,2t−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2s). (1.53)
We use the above equations to identify the parameters governing the stochastic volatility
process, Equation (1.6), {ρh, ρs, σ¯, σ2s} from the data.17
B.2 Data
We take the 1970-2009 Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and drop the low income sample. We keep all households in
the sample that have at least two but no more than 10 household members who work
combined at least 1040 hours per year and a male household head no younger than 25
and not older than 55. We focus on the age of 25 to 55 to abstract from the effects of
household formation and retirement. We construct household income as pre-tax labor
income plus private and public transfers minus all taxes. These selection criteria yield
a sample that has on average about 1815 observations for each year of the survey.
17Where σ¯ = sqrt(exp(µs + σ
2
s
(1−ρ2s) ) corresponds to the level-mean of Equation (1.53).
42
B.3 Estimation
Our estimation procedure proceeds in two steps. First we estimate the deterministic
component, f(oi,a,t) (Eq. (1.54)), by running an OLS regression of log household income
on time dummies, age dummies, schooling dummies interacted with up to a quadratic
age trend, and household size dummies.
f(oi,a,t) = θ0 + θT1 Dt + θT2 xi,a,t, (1.54)
where Dt is a vector of year dummy variables, t = {1970, ..., 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009}, and xi,a,t is a vector containing all remaining regressors for household
i with a years of labor market experience at date t. We eliminate any observation where
the residual of this regression, y∗i,a,t, belongs to the bottom or top per percent of all
residuals for an age group.
From the residuals of this regression, we then calculate the sample variance within an
age-year cell, s2a,t, across ages, a = {1, . . . , 31}, and times t as well as covariances c1a,t =
cov(y∗i,a,t, y∗i,a−1,t−1) and c2a,t = cov(y∗i,a,t, y∗i,a−2,t−2). This yields 992 sample-variance and
1798 sample-covariance estimates, where each estimate is constructed from on average
55 observations on the log-income residual.
Given the income process as laid out above, we can derive the moment conditions
corresponding to the estimates for empirical variance s2 and first and second order auto
covariances in residual household income c1, c2 for each age-year combination.
s2a,t = σ
µ,2
t−a + σ2τ +
a−1∑
j=1
ρ2jh σ
h,2
a−j,t−j + ψsa,t (1.55)
c1a,t = σ
µ,2
t−a + ρhσh,2a−1,t−1 + ψc1a,t (1.56)
c2a,t = σ
µ,2
t−a + ρ2hσ
h,2
a−2,t−2 + ψc2a,t (1.57)
where σh,2a,t obeys Equations (1.52) and (1.53) and ψ are the residuals.
B.4 Results
First-Stage Regression
The first-stage regression, Equation (1.54), controls for observable household charac-
teristics and hence filters out the deterministic cross-sectional variation in household
income. The results are comparable to existing studies, implying a concave earnings
function in age and education. The inclusion of age-education interactions as well as
controlling for age, education, and household size nonparametrically considerably raises
the R2 = 0.6.
The residuals of this regression yield the idiosyncratic component of income, y∗i,a,t,
from which we obtain the idiosyncratic cross-sectional variation in household income.
Figure 1.10 depicts the variance of idiosyncratic income by age averaged across 1970-
2009. The variance at labor market entry is already substantial and it increases by
about 50% after 30 years of labor market participation. The initial dispersion helps to
identify σ2τ + σ
µ,2
t−a, whereas the rate of increase contains information on σh,2a,t .
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Figure 1.10: Idiosyncratic cross-sectional variance by age
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Notes: Cross-sectional variance averaged across time
calculated from the residuals of the first-stage regression.
Parameter Estimates
We estimate the following parameters by the generalized method of moments (GMM)
minimizing the sum of squared residuals ψ2 given the moment conditions in Equations
(1.55), (1.56), and (1.57):(
ρh ρs µs ξ1 ξ2 σ
µ,2
t σ
2
τ σ
,2
t
)
, (1.58)
for t = {1939, ..., 1969, . . . , 2009}.
We can track the history of the variance of persistent income shocks, σ,2t , back to
the year when the oldest cohorts at the start of the survey in 1970 entered the labor
market. This way we obtain a time series for income uncertainty going back to 1939,
see Figure 1.11.
Table 1.5 summarizes the parameters values of interest. Persistent shocks to id-
iosyncratic income have an annual autocorrelation of ρh = 0.9069 and an average stan-
dard deviation of σ¯ = sqrt(exp(µs + var(σ
,2
t )
2(1−ρ2s) ) = 0.1483 – similar to the estimates by
Storesletten et al. (2004). For shocks to the variance of persistent income shocks, we
estimate an annual autocorrelation of ρs = 0.6651 and a coefficient of variation of
σs√
1−ρ2s
= sqrt(exp(var(σ
,2
t )
(1−ρ2s) )− 1) = 0.607.
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Table 1.5: Parameter estimates
ρh ρs σ¯
σs√
1−ρ2s
0.9069 0.6651 0.1483 0.6070
Notes: Where σ¯ in Equation 1.6 corresponds to the (level-)mean
of the persistent component, sqrt(exp(µs + var(σ
,2
t )
(1−ρ2s) ), and the risk-shifting parameter s follows from the coefficient of variation implied
by the variation in the persistent component, sqrt(exp(var(σ
,2
t )
(1−ρ2s) )− 1).These annual estimates are then converted to quarterly frequency.
Figure 1.11: Idiosyncratic income uncertainty 1939-2009
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Notes: Constructed time series for the variance of persistent idiosyncratic income shocks based
on PSID data. The second panel is without the linear-quadratic trend.
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C. Asset Distribution
Table 1.6 summarizes the wealth distribution implied by our model (i.e., for the baseline
calibration without fluctuations in uncertainty). As with any incomplete markets model
that does not resort to heterogeneity in preferences or extremely skewed processes for
idiosyncratic productivity, we fail to match the skewness in wealth documented for the
U.S. Whereas the fraction of wealth held by the richest quintile is about 80% in the U.S.,
the top quintile in our model holds only 41% of total wealth. The same discrepancy
holds for the Gini coefficient, where our model falls short as well – 0.38 versus 0.8 in
the data.
Table 1.6: Asset distribution
Quintiles Gini-Coeff.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Fraction of total wealth 3.62 10.93 17.98 26.16 41.31 0.38
...share held in money 31.99 18.54 12.56 8.32 5.54
...share held in capital 68.01 81.46 87.44 91.68 94.46
Fraction without money 0.87 1.00 1.61 2.42 2.65
Fraction without capital 4.30 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00
These shortcomings are, however, not of great importance for our transmission mech-
anism. The top quintile is well insured, because they hold a sizable amount of liquid
assets. Hence, they are least affected by ups and downs in uncertainty. The lower
quintiles are the ones building up precautionary savings and thus the ones that react
strongest to changes in uncertainty. In this dimension our model replicates the data
fairly well. The poorest quintile in the U.S. has about zero wealth on average – includ-
ing indebted households. The poorest households in our model hold only few assets –
3.6% of total wealth.
Our model also has implications for the ratio of liquid to illiquid assets conditional on
how rich households are in total. Households save in money because it provides better
short-term consumption smoothing than capital. This value of liquidity decreases in
the amount of money a household holds. Hence, our model implies that the share of
liquid assets in the portfolio declines in total wealth. Figure 1.12 plots the prediction
of our model and the data equivalent taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances
2004 (SCF) according to the definitions by Kaplan and Violante (2014). The poorest
households in the U.S. and in our model predominantly hold liquid assets. The share
of liquid assets then rapidly falls below 20% in both graphs, but rises again in the SCF
for the richest households. This is because stocks, mutual funds, and non-governmental
bond holdings are concentrated at the top quintiles as can be seen by comparing the
broad liquidity measure, which includes all of those, to the narrow definition. If we
also exclude those assets that usually induce some transaction cost (e.g., a commission)
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Figure 1.12: Share of liquid assets in total net worth against percentiles of total wealth
in 2004
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Notes: We compare our measure of liquid net worth (see Figure 1.1) to a
broader definition of liquid assets that includes mutual funds, stocks, and
non-governmental bonds as in Kaplan and Violante (2014). For graphical
illustration we make use of an Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear
smoother with bandwidth 0.15.
when acquiring them from a bank or broker, the share of liquid assets is substantially
reduced for the asset rich.
D. Quality of the Numerical Solution
The equilibrium forecasting rules are obtained by regressing them in each iteration
of the algorithm on 10.000 observations. We generate the observations by simulating
the model in parallel on 20 machines, letting each economy run for 750 periods and
discarding the first 250 periods. The R2 is generally above 99% for all calibrations; see
Tables 1.9 and 1.10. In the case of perfect stabilization, pit is virtually constant, such
that the R2 of the pi-forecasting is a nonsensical statistic. Figure 1.13 shows that our
results are robust to increasing the resolution for the aggregate state variables.
Following Den Haan (2010), we also test the out-of-sample performance of the fore-
casting rules. For this we initialize the model and the forecasting rules at steady state
values, feed in the same shock sequence, but otherwise let them run independently.
Figure 1.14 plots time series of the prices q and pi as well as the states K and M taken
from the simulation of the model and the forecasting rules. The equilibrium forecasting
rules track the evolution of the underlying model without any tendency of divergence.
Table 1.7 summarizes the mean and maximum difference between the series generated
47
Figure 1.13: Uncertainty shock with higher resolution in K and M
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Notes: See figure 1.5. We increase the number of gridpoints to 5 for capital and 7 for
money.
by the model and the forecasting rules. The mean error for all four time series is less
than 0.3%. The maximum errors are small, too.
Table 1.7: Forecasting errors
Price of capital qt Capital Kt Inflation pit Real money Mt
Mean Error 0.28 0.07 0.01 0.22
Max Error 1.20 0.20 0.07 0.69
Notes: Percentage differences in out-of-sample forecasts between forecasting rules
and model for t = {1, ..., 1.500}; see Den Haan (2010).
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Figure 1.14: Out-of-sample performance of the forecasting rules
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Notes: Out-of-sample comparison between law of motions and model zoomed in at t = {1000, ..., 1.500} for visibility; see
Den Haan (2010).
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E. Welfare
Table 1.8 provides the long run welfare effects with and without stabilization after 75
years when the economy is back at its steady state.
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Table 1.8: Welfare after 75 years
Policy regime: Constant money growth
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.20 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.18
Median -0.23 -0.18 -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.18
Quintiles of Human Capital
Conditional -0.09 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16
Median -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 -0.16 -0.23
Policy regime: Inflation stabilization
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
Median -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.14
Median 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.17
Policy regime: Fed reaction function
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11
Median -0.14 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.15
Median -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.20
Notes: Welfare costs in terms of consumption equivalents (CE) as defined in (1.20).
Conditional refers to integrating out the missing dimensions, whereas Median refers to
median asset holdings of the respective other assets. We track households over 300
quarters and average over 100 independent model simulations.
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F. Robustness Checks
For the risk aversion parameter, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the average
markup, and the frequency of price adjustment, we take standard values from the
literature as there is no direct counterpart in the data. To account for this loose cali-
bration strategy, we check the robustness of our findings with respect to the assumed
parameter values. We do so by varying one of the parameters at a time while recali-
brating the discount factor and the participation frequency of households to match the
targeted capital and money to output ratios and the capital adjustment costs to match
a relative investment volatility of 3.18
We find our results to be robust to all the considered parameter variations. The
impulse response functions for output, consumption, investment, and inflation are dis-
played in Figure 1.15. The output drop on impact always remains around 0.5% – the
result of our baseline calibration. Key for this robustness is the recalibration of other
parameters. For example, if households are assumed to be less risk averse, then capital
must be less liquid to match the observed holdings of liquid assets. Therefore, while
a lower risk aversion makes the increase in precautionary savings less pronounced, the
inferred lower liquidity of capital intensifies the liquidity effect. This leaves the output
effect almost unchanged. In other words, the stability of our results stems from the
model inherent trade-offs.
18For the robustness check where we set the inverse Frisch elasticity to 1, physical capital becomes so
attractive to households, that the calibration forces capital to become very illiquid in order to match
the observed money to output ratio. Then, however, investment moves so little (as close to nobody
can trade) that there is no positive adjustment cost such that the relative investment volatility is 3.
In these cases we assume no capital adjustment costs.
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Figure 1.15: Uncertainty shock – Robustness
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Notes: See Figure 1.5 or 1.6.
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G. Equilibrium Forecasting Rules
Tables 1.9 to 1.11 display the equilibrium laws of motion for the Krusell-Smith equilib-
rium.
Table 1.9: Laws of motion for the price of capital
Baseline ξ κ µ γ
θ2 = 0 θ2 = 103 θ2 = .35 3* 5 0.04 0.5 5* 15 1*
θ3 = 0 θ3 = 0 θ3 = .9
β1q
s1 1.71 1.39 1.75 0.79 2.03 3.46 -0.44 0.15 2.36 5.18
s2 1.71 1.41 1.75 0.87 2.01 3.30 -0.36 0.67 2.34 5.70
s3 1.70 1.50 1.77 0.89 1.99 3.19 -0.39 0.53 2.33 5.85
s4 1.69 1.55 1.78 0.90 2.00 3.10 -0.37 0.35 2.33 5.96
s5 1.70 1.62 1.79 0.91 2.03 3.09 -0.35 0.22 2.34 6.04
s6 1.72 1.66 1.80 0.93 2.05 3.03 -0.39 0.33 2.35 6.29
s7 1.82 1.75 1.82 1.00 2.14 3.06 -0.25 0.51 2.40 6.58
β2q
s1 0.50 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.63 0.65 0.46 0.08 0.74 1.02
s2 0.52 0.13 0.24 0.16 0.65 0.68 0.47 0.10 0.75 1.17
s3 0.53 0.14 0.26 0.17 0.66 0.69 0.48 0.12 0.77 1.30
s4 0.54 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.68 0.69 0.50 0.13 0.78 1.45
s5 0.55 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.69 0.69 0.51 0.15 0.78 1.60
s6 0.58 0.18 0.31 0.24 0.71 0.69 0.54 0.17 0.78 1.80
s7 0.61 0.20 0.34 0.29 0.74 0.73 0.57 0.20 0.79 2.04
β3q
s1 -0.86 -0.83 -1.03 -0.45 -1.00 -1.97 0.55 -0.04 -1.22 -2.87
s2 -0.86 -0.85 -1.03 -0.49 -0.99 -1.86 0.49 -0.36 -1.21 -3.18
s3 -0.87 -0.90 -1.04 -0.51 -0.99 -1.79 0.49 -0.26 -1.21 -3.25
s4 -0.87 -0.94 -1.05 -0.51 -1.00 -1.74 0.48 -0.15 -1.22 -3.29
s5 -0.88 -0.99 -1.06 -0.50 -1.03 -1.74 0.46 -0.07 -1.23 -3.30
s6 -0.90 -1.02 -1.07 -0.51 -1.05 -1.72 0.48 -0.13 -1.25 -3.42
s7 -0.98 -1.08 -1.10 -0.55 -1.13 -1.74 0.38 -0.23 -1.31 -3.56
R2
99.55 98.54 99.70 98.52 99.74 99.58 99.40 98.77 99.57 99.00
* For readability the coefficients of the law of motion are mutiplied by 10.000.
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Table 1.10: Laws of motion for inflation
Baseline ξ κ µ γ
θ2 = 0 θ2 = 103 θ2 = .35 3 5 0.04 0.5 5 15 1
θ3 = 0 θ3 = 0 θ3 = .9
β1pi
s1 2.80 0.48 0.08 12.46 2.65 44.20 -19.49 40.74 3.76 6.07
s2 2.37 0.49 0.50 13.19 2.40 43.59 -19.30 33.41 3.54 6.34
s3 2.16 0.49 1.20 14.36 2.44 44.14 -19.31 27.85 3.56 6.57
s4 1.67 0.49 1.49 14.33 2.17 41.17 -19.21 21.63 3.26 6.55
s5 1.19 0.49 1.82 14.08 1.86 37.87 -19.55 18.86 2.87 6.63
s6 1.00 0.49 2.20 13.99 1.41 34.76 -19.92 2.06 2.54 6.56
s7 0.59 0.49 2.18 13.54 0.77 28.95 -20.62 -39.60 2.29 6.28
β2pi
s1 4.19 -0.00 0.53 4.18 3.87 10.06 2.83 3.36 4.03 2.79
s2 4.31 0.00 0.71 4.64 3.97 11.44 2.85 3.87 4.12 3.09
s3 4.39 0.00 0.87 5.04 4.06 11.97 2.89 4.30 4.23 3.37
s4 4.47 0.00 1.02 5.42 4.14 12.07 2.96 4.69 4.28 3.65
s5 4.57 0.00 1.19 5.85 4.26 12.19 3.06 5.13 4.36 3.98
s6 4.76 0.00 1.38 6.39 4.42 12.34 3.21 5.64 4.49 4.39
s7 5.17 0.00 1.67 7.27 4.80 13.19 3.49 6.44 4.88 5.03
β3pi
s1 1.17 0.01 0.78 -5.25 1.14 -22.92 14.99 -22.73 0.71 -1.78
s2 1.27 0.01 0.49 -5.76 1.11 -22.25 14.73 -18.23 0.74 -2.01
s3 1.22 0.01 0.00 -6.58 0.92 -22.81 14.62 -14.83 0.61 -2.22
s4 1.36 0.01 -0.22 -6.59 0.92 -21.24 14.46 -11.04 0.68 -2.26
s5 1.48 0.01 -0.47 -6.46 0.95 -19.50 14.60 -9.37 0.81 -2.34
s6 1.40 0.01 -0.78 -6.43 1.05 -18.03 14.75 0.91 0.88 -2.34
s7 1.48 0.01 -0.83 -6.08 1.29 -14.71 15.13 26.52 0.97 -2.13
R2
99.87 88.77 99.66 99.89 99.84 99.08 99.81 99.89 99.73 99.87
Notes: For readability all values are mutiplied by 100.
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Table 1.11: Laws of mo-
tion for Fed policy rule
continued
Baseline
θ2 = .35 θ2 = .35
θ3 = .9 θ3 = .9
β4q β
4
pi
s1 5.65 19.43
s2 25.18 20.84
s3 33.51 20.71
s4 36.83 20.32
s5 47.80 19.39
s6 70.02 18.78
s7 116.69 19.15
Notes: For readability all
values are mutiplied by
100.
56
Chapter 2
Transmission of Monetary Policy with
Heterogeneity in Household Portfolios
This paper assesses the importance of heterogeneity in household portfo-
lios for the transmission of monetary policy in a New Keynesian business
cycle model with incomplete markets and portfolio choice under liquidity
constraints. In this model, the consumption response to changes in interest
rates depends on the joint distribution of labor income, liquid and illiquid
assets. The presence of liquidity-constrained households weakens the direct
effect of changes in the real interest rate on consumption, but at the same
time makes consumption more responsive to equilibrium changes in labor
income. The redistributive consequences, including debt deflation, amplify
the consumption response, whereas they dampen the investment response.
Market incompleteness has important implications for the conduct of mon-
etary policy as it relies to a larger extent on indirect equilibrium effects in
comparison to economies with a representative household.
1. Introduction
A household’s portfolio generally consists of non-tradable and tradable assets. The
most important non-tradable asset is human capital. It is the primary source of income
for most households and at the same time subject to substantial idiosyncratic shocks.
The presence of such shocks gives rise to both precautionary savings and cross-sectional
differences in holdings of tradable assets when markets are incomplete. Importantly,
tradable assets vary in their degree of liquidity. In fact, a large fraction of households in
the United States holds low levels of liquid assets relative to their income, although most
households exhibit considerable positive net worth.1 This has important implications for
the transmission of monetary policy, because consumption of low-liquidity households
is less sensitive to interest rates but responds more strongly to current income. While
the monetary authority has direct control over the interest rate, changes in income only
arise indirectly out of second-round general equilibrium effects.
This paper assesses quantitatively the implications of heterogeneity in household
1See Kaplan et al. (2014) for a documentation of this fact for the U.S. and other industrialized
countries.
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portfolios for the transmission of monetary policy and the relative importance of the
direct and indirect transmission channels. Toward this end, I build a New Keynesian dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with asset-market incompleteness,
idiosyncratic income risk, and sticky prices. The novel feature of the model is to allow
for portfolio choice between liquid and illiquid assets in a business-cycle framework.
The illiquid asset is real capital. It can only be traded with a certain probability each
period but pays a higher return than the liquid asset, which comprises nominal gov-
ernment and household debt and can be traded without frictions. These characteristics
make sure that the model endogenously generates the distribution of portfolio shares
and marginal propensities to consume across households as documented for the United
States.2 In particular, illiquidity of the real asset leads to “wealthy hand-to-mouth”
households that explain the high aggregate propensity to consume out of current in-
come (cf. Kaplan and Violante, 2014).
My main finding is that, when markets are incomplete, the direct response to changes
in the interest rate makes up only 35% of the consumption response to monetary shocks,
while indirect effects account for the remaining 65%. Indirect effects mainly work
through equilibrium changes in labor income (about 85%), which represents the most
important income source for the majority of households. The revaluation of nominal
claims, including debt deflation, adds another indirect channel of monetary policy,
which roughly accounts for 15% of the total response.
The importance of indirect effects contrasts sharply with the standard New Keyne-
sian model that builds on a representative household. In the latter, the direct effect
explains close to all of the consumption response. The indirect effect is quantitatively
unimportant, because it works exclusively through changes in life-time income that
monetary shocks hardly affect. With complete markets, savings adjust to undo any
temporary mismatch between income and consumption. In an economy with incomplete
markets, by contrast, borrowing constraints and precautionary motives are important.
They make savings and, thus, consumption less sensitive to interest rate changes. This
renders the direct effect of monetary policy less potent. At the same time, indirect
effects become stronger because current income is a binding constraint for households
at or close to the borrowing constraint. What is more, revaluation of nominal assets
impacts on the tightness of borrowing constraints as inflation changes the real value
of debt. This amplifies the effect of borrowing constraints through Fisher (1933) debt
deflation.
The indirect effect through changes in income is, therefore, the key determinant of
the consumption response to monetary shocks in an economy with incomplete markets.
This reversal of the importance of direct and indirect effects explains how monetary
policy may have sizable effects on aggregate consumption while interest rate elasticities
at the household level are low.3
While the consumption response to monetary shocks works through different chan-
nels and is also stronger in total, a monetary shock moves output to a similar extent
2See the empirical literature on the consumption response to transfers; e.g. Johnson et al. (2006),
Parker et al. (2013), or Misra and Surico (2014).
3See for example the handbook chapter on monetary policy by Christiano et al. (1999) for evidence
on the aggregate consequences of monetary policy shocks.
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in the representative and heterogeneous agent version of the model. Investment falls
by 25% less in the incomplete-markets setting and, thus, cancels out the stronger con-
sumption response. The reason for this smaller reaction of investment relates to the
fact that monetary policy has non-trivial redistributive consequences that interact with
heterogeneity in household portfolios. In line with the empirical findings by Coibion
et al. (2012), a monetary tightening increases inequality and makes households at the
top of the wealth distribution, who primarily hold real assets, richer. Thereby they
stabilize investment demand after a contractionary monetary policy shock.
With these results, my paper contributes to the recently evolving literature that
incorporates market incompleteness and idiosyncratic uncertainty into New Keynesian
models.4 As such it builds on the New Keynesian literature with its focus on nominal
rigidities. This literature has proven successful in replicating the impulse responses
to monetary policy shocks as identified from time-series data (cf. Christiano et al.,
2005). What my paper and other recent contributions add to this literature is the
attempt to endogenize heterogeneity in wealth.5 In this class of models, the response
of consumption and savings depends on the distribution of wealth, which evolves in
response to aggregate shocks.
Relative to this literature, my paper is the first to analyze monetary policy in a
business cycle framework with portfolio choice. My work is most closely related to
Kaplan et al. (2015), which originated in parallel. They also decompose the effects of
monetary policy into direct and indirect effects but focus on the consumption response
to a one-time unexpected monetary shock. My model, in contrast, is calibrated to match
business cycle statistics and, thus, adds to their analysis by considering the response of
consumption, investment, and output in unison.
This paper also contributes to the assessment of debt deflation as transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. My analysis shows that redistribution through inflation
is of secondary importance relative to the effect of monetary policy on aggregate income
in models with sticky prices.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
and Section 3 discusses the solution method. Section 4 explains the calibration of the
model. Section 5 presents the quantitative results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
The model economy consists of households, firms, and a government/monetary au-
thority. Households consume, supply labor, obtain profit income, accumulate physical
capital, and trade in the bonds market. Firms combine capital and labor services to
produce goods. The government issues bonds, raises taxes, and purchases goods, while
the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate. Let me describe each agent in
turn.
4See Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), Oh and Reis (2012), Gornemann et al. (2012), McKay and
Reis (2016), Ravn and Sterk (2013), Den Haan et al. (2014), Auclert (2014), Bayer et al. (2015),
McKay et al. (2015), Werning (2015) and Kaplan et al. (2015).
5Exogenous heterogeneity is well-established in New Keynesian models. See for example Iacoviello
(2005) and Gal´ı et al. (2007).
6See Doepke et al. (2015) for an analysis of this channel in a flexible-price model.
59
Households face idiosyncratic income risk, but insurance markets are incomplete.
They self-insure by trading nominal bonds and illiquid physical capital. I model this
illiquidity as infrequent participation in the capital market. Every period a fraction
of households is randomly selected to trade physical capital.7 Households are either
workers or entrepreneurs with a certain probability. Worker-households supply labor
on a perfectly competitive market and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their labor
productivity. Entrepreneur-households do not supply labor, but instead receive an equal
share of economy-wide profits.8,9,10
There are three types of firms. Perfectly competitive intermediate-goods producers
hire capital and labor from households and sell the homogeneous intermediate good
at marginal costs. Monopolistically competitive resellers then differentiate the inter-
mediate good and set prices above marginal costs. They may, however, only adjust
their prices with some positive probability each period as in Calvo (1983). As a result,
demand determines output in the short-run, because a fraction of firms has to satisfy
demand at given prices. The differentiated goods are finally bundled again by perfectly
competitive final-good producers to final goods used for consumption and investment.
Monetary policy follows a Taylor (1993)-type rule that determines the nominal in-
terest rate at which the government and households may borrow and lend to each other.
It thereby affects the real rate of interest because of sticky prices. The balance sheet
of the central bank is not modeled explicitly. The government collects proportional
income taxes to finance its interest expenses and government purchases. The latter
follow a simple rule to stabilize debt.
The model economy is subject to aggregate shocks as in Krusell and Smith (1998).
The shocks affect total factor productivity of intermediate-goods production and the
Taylor-rule. I next describe the model in more detail.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical households of measure one indexed by i ∈
[0, 1]. Households are infinitely lived, have time-separable preferences with time-discount
factor β, and derive felicity from consumption cit and leisure. Households can be en-
trepreneurs (sit = 0) or workers (sit = 1). Transition between both types is exogenous
and stochastic, but the fraction of households that are entrepreneurs at any given time
t = 0, 1, 2, ... is constant.
Workers supply labor. Their labor income wthitnit is composed of the wage rate, wt,
7This setup builds on Chapter 1. Where there is overlay the exposition closely follows Chapter 1.
We choose to exclude trading as a choice and hence use a simplified framework relative to Kaplan et al.
(2015) for numerical tractability. Random participation keeps the households’ value function concave,
thus makes first-order conditions sufficient, and therefore allows us to use a variant of the endogenous
grid method as algorithm for our numerical calculations. See Chapter 1 for proofs.
8According to the Congressional Budget Office, the top 1% of the income distribution receives
about 30% of their income from financial income, a much larger share than any other segment of the
population.
9For reasons of tractability, I abstract from tradable shares in monopoly profits and instead intro-
duce an exogenous employment state that receives all profits.
10Fixed types of workers and entrepreneurs (or capitalists) without stochastic transitions can be
found in Walsh (2014) or Broer et al. (2015), while Romei (2014) uses stochastic transitions.
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hours worked, nit, and idiosyncratic labor productivity, hit, which evolves according to
the following first-order autoregressive process:
log hit = ρh log hit−1 + it, it ∼ N (0, σh) . (2.1)
Entrepreneurs have zero productivity on the labor market, but instead receive an equal
share of the economy’s total profits Πt. They pay the same tax rate as workers, 1− τ .
Households have GHH preferences (cf. Greenwood et al., 1988) and maximize the
discounted sum of felicity:
V = E0 max{cit,nit}
∞∑
t=0
βtu (xit) , (2.2)
where xit = cit−hitG(nit) is household i’s composite demand for the physical consump-
tion good cit and leisure.
The disutility of work, hitG(nit), determines a workers’ labor supply given the ag-
gregate wage rate through the first-order condition:
hitG
′(nit) = τwthit. (2.3)
Under the above assumption, a workers’ labor decision does not respond to idiosyncratic
productivity hit, but only to the net aggregate wage τwt. Thus I can drop the household-
specific index i, and set nit = Nt.
The Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply is constant with γ being the inverse
elasticity:
G(Nt) =
1
1 + γN
1+γ
t , γ > 0.
Exploiting the first-order condition on labor supply, the disutility of working can be
expressed in terms of the net wage rate:
hitG(Nt) = hit
N1+γt
1 + γ =
hitG
′(Nt)Nt
1 + γ =
τwthitNt
1 + γ .
In this way the demand for xit can be rewritten as:
xit = cit − hitG(Nt) = cit − τwthitNt1 + γ .
Total labor input supplied is given by:
N˜t = Nt
∫
sithitdi.
Asset markets are incomplete. Households may only self-insure in nominal bonds,
b˜it, and in capital, kit. Holdings of capital have to be non-negative, but households may
issue nominal bonds up to an exogeneously specified limit −b ∈ (−∞, 0]. Moreover,
trading capital is subject to a friction.
This trading friction only allows a randomly selected fraction of households, ν, to
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participate in the market for capital each period. All other households obtain dividends,
but may only adjust their holdings of nominal bonds. For those households participating
in the capital market, the budget constraint reads:11
cit + bit+1 + qtkit+1 =
RBt−1
pit
bit + (qt + rt)kit + τ [sitwthitNt + (1− sit)Πt] ,
kit+1 ≥ 0, bit+1 ≥ −b (2.4)
where bit is the real value of nominal bond holdings, kit are capital holdings, qt is the
price of capital, rt is the rental rate or “dividend”, RBt−1 is the gross nominal return on
bonds, and pit = PtPt−1 is the inflation rate. I denote real bond holdings of household i
at the end of period t by bit+1 := b˜it+1Pt .
For those households that cannot trade in the market for capital the budget con-
straint simplifies to:
cit + bit+1 =
RBt−1
pit
bit + rtkit + τ [sitwthitNt + (1− sit)Πt] ,
bit+1 ≥ −b. (2.5)
Note that I assume that the depreciation of capital is replaced through maintenance
such that the dividend, rt, is the net return on capital.
A household’s optimal consumption-savings decision is a non-linear function of that
household’s asset portfolio {bit, kit} and employment type {sit, hit}. Accordingly, the
price level Pt and aggregate real bonds Bt+1 = B˜t+1Pt are functions of the joint distribution
Θt over idiosyncratic states (bt, kt, ht, st). This makes the distribution Θt a state variable
of the households’ planning problem. The distribution Θt fluctuates in response to
aggregate monetary and total factor productivity shocks. Let Ω stand in for aggregate
shocks.
With this setup, two Bellman equations characterize the dynamic planning problem
of a household; Va in case the household can adjust its capital holdings and Vn otherwise:
Va(b, k, h, s; Θ,Ω) = max
k′,b′a
u[c(b, b′a, k, k′, h, s)] + β[νEV a(b′a, k′, h′, s′,Θ′,Ω′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′a, k′, h′, s′,Θ′,Ω′)],
Vn(b, k, h, s; Θ,Ω) = max
b′n
u[c(b, b′n, k, h, s)] + β[νEV a(b′n, k, h′, s′,Θ′,Ω′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′n, k, h′, s′,Θ′,Ω′)]. (2.6)
In line with this notation, I define the optimal consumption policies for the adjust-
ment and non-adjustment cases as c∗a and c∗n, the nominal bond holding policies as b∗a
and b∗n, and the capital investment policy as k∗. See Appendix A for the first order
conditions.
11The household problem can be expressed in terms of composite good xit by making use of cit =
xit + τwthitNt1+γ .
62
2.2 Intermediate Good Producer
Intermediate goods are produced with a constant returns to scale production function:
Yt = ZtN˜αt K
(1−α)
t ,
where Zt is total factor productivity (TFP). It follows a first-order autoregressive pro-
cess:
logZt = ρZ logZt−1 + Zt , Zt ∼ N (0, σZ) . (2.7)
Let MCt be the relative price at which the intermediate good is sold to resellers. The
intermediate-good producer maximizes profits,
MCtYt = MCtZtN˜αt K
(1−α)
t − wtN˜t − (rt + δ)Kt,
but it operates in perfectly competitive markets, such that the real wage and the user
costs of capital are given by the marginal products of labor and capital:
wt = αMCtZt
(
Kt/N˜t
)1−α
, (2.8)
rt + δ = (1− α)MCtZt
(
N˜t/Kt
)α
. (2.9)
2.3 Resellers
Resellers differentiate the intermediate good and set prices. They are risk neutral and
have the same discount factor as households. For tractability reasons, I assume that
resellers obtain an arbitrarily small share of profits and do neither participate in the
bond nor capital market. This assumption separates the resellers’ price setting problem
from the households’ saving problem.
By setting prices of final goods, resellers maximize expected discounted future prof-
its:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΠjt. (2.10)
Resellers buy the intermediate good at a price equaling the nominal marginal costs,
MCtPt, where MCt are the real marginal costs at which the intermediate good is
traded due to perfect competition, and then differentiate them without the need of
additional input factors. The goods that resellers produce come in varieties uniformly
distributed on the unit interval and each indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Resellers are monopolistic
competitors, and hence charge a markup over their marginal costs. They are, however,
subject to a Calvo (1983) price setting friction, and can only update their prices with
probability θ. They maximize the expected value of future discounted profits by setting
today’s price, pjt, taking into account the price setting friction:
max
{pjt}
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEΠjt,t+s =
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEyjt,t+s(pjt −MCt+sPt+s) (2.11)
s.t. : yjt,t+s =
(
pjt
Pt+s
)−η
yt+s,
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where Πjt,t+s are profits and yjt,t+s is the production level in t + s of a firm j that set
prices in t.
I obtain the following first-order condition with respect to pjt:
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEyjt,t+s
 p
∗
jt
Pt−1
− η
η − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
MCt+s
Pt+s
Pt−1
 = 0, (2.12)
where µ is the static optimal markup.
Recall that resellers are risk neutral, and that they do not interact with households in
any intertemporal trades. Therefore, I can solve the resellers’ planning problem locally
by log-linearizing around the zero-inflation steady state, without having to know the
solution of the households’ problem. This yields the New Keynesian Phillips curve, see
e.g. Gal´ı (2008):
log pit = βEt(log pit+1) + κ(logMCt + µ), (2.13)
where
κ = (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
.
Besides differentiating intermediate goods, I assume that resellers also obtain rents
from adjusting the aggregate capital stock. The cost of adjusting the stock of capital
is φ2
(
∆Kt+1
Kt
)2
Kt. Hence, resellers will adjust the stock of capital until the following
first-order condition holds:
qt = 1 + φ
∆Kt+1
Kt
. (2.14)
2.4 Final Good Producer
Perfectly competitive final good producers use differentiated goods as input taking
input and sell price as given. Final goods are used for consumption and investment.
The problem of the representative final good producer is as follows:
max
Yt,yjt∈[0,1]
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
pjtyjtdj (2.15)
s.t. : Yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
η−1
η
jt dj
) η
η−1
,
where yjt is the demanded quantity of differentiated good j as input. From the
zero-profit condition, the price of the final good is given by Pt =
(∫ 1
0 p
1−η
jt dj
) 1
1−η .
2.5 Central Bank and Government
Monetary policy sets the gross nominal interest rate, RBt , according to a Taylor (1993)-
type rule that reacts to inflation deviations from target and exhibits interest rate
smoothing:
RBt
RB
=
(
RBt−1
RB
)ρ
RB (1 + pit
1 + pi
)θpi
Dt , (2.16)
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where log Dt ∼ N (0, σD) are monetary policy shocks. All else equal, the central bank
raises the nominal rate above its steady-state value RB whenever inflation exceeds its
target value. It does so by more than one-to-one to guarantee a non-explosive price path
(θpi > 1). The parameter ρRB captures “intrinsic policy inertia”, a feature supported
by empirical evidence, see Nakamura and Steinsson (2013).
The fiscal authority decides on government purchases, Gt, raises tax revenues, Tt,
and issues nominal bonds. Let Bt+1 denote their time t real value. The government
budget constraint reads:
Bt+1 =
RBt−1
1 + pit
Bt +Gt − Tt, (2.17)
where real tax revenues are given by:
Tt = (1− τ)
[
(NtWt
∫
sihiΘt(b, k, h, s)) + Πt
]
. (2.18)
I assume that government purchases stabilize the debt level,
Gt = γ1 − γ2(Bt −B), (2.19)
with B equal to steady state debt, while the tax parameter τ remains constant. Ad-
justment via government purchases is the baseline formulation because changing taxes
would directly redistribute across households. This also applies to lump-sum taxes in
this environment. Government purchases, in contrast, do not have any direct distribu-
tional consequences.
2.6 Bonds, Capital, Goods, and Labor Market Clearing
The labor market clears at the competitive wage given in (2.8); so does the market for
capital services if (2.9) holds. The nominal bonds market clears, whenever the following
equation holds:
Bt+1 =
∫
[νb∗a(b, k, h, s; q, pi) + (1− ν)b∗n(b, k, h, s; q, pi)] Θt(b, k, h, s)dbdkdhds. (2.20)
Last, the market for capital has to clear:
qt = 1 + φ
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
= 1 + νφK
∗
t+1 −Kt
Kt
, (2.21)
K∗t+1 :=
∫
k∗(b, k, h, s; qt, pit)Θt(b, k, h, s)dbdkdhds,
Kt+1 = Kt + ν(K∗t+1 −Kt),
where the first equation stems from competition in the production of capital goods, the
second equation defines the aggregate supply of funds from households trading capital,
and the third equation defines the law of motion of aggregate capital. The goods market
then clears due to Walras’ law, whenever both, bonds and capital markets, clear.
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2.7 Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in this model is a set of policy functions {c∗a, c∗n, b∗a, b∗n, k∗}, value
functions {Va, Vn}, pricing functions {r, RB, w, pi, q}, aggregate bonds, capital, and labor
supply functions {B,K,N}, distributions Θt over individual asset holdings, types, and
productivity, and a perceived law of motion Γ, such that
1. Given Va, Vn, Γ, prices, and distributions, the policy functions {c∗a, c∗n, b∗a, b∗n, k∗}
solve the households’ planning problem, and given prices, distributions, and the
policy functions {c∗a, c∗n, b∗a, b∗n, k∗}, the value functions {Va, Vn} are a solution to
the Bellman equations (2.6).
2. The labor, the final-goods, the bonds, the capital, and the intermediate-good
markets clear, i.e. (2.8), (2.13), (2.20), and (2.21) hold.
3. The actual law of motion and the perceived law of motion Γ coincide, i.e. Θ′ =
Γ(Θ,Ω′).
3. Numerical Implementation
The dynamic program (2.6) and hence the recursive equilibrium is not computable,
because it involves the infinite dimensional object Θt.
3.1 Krusell-Smith Equilibrium
To turn this problem into a computable one, I assume that households predict future
prices only on the basis of a restricted set of moments, as in Krusell and Smith (1997,
1998). Specifically, I make the assumption that households condition their expectations
on last period’s aggregate real bond holdings, Bt, last period’s nominal interest rate,
RBt−1, and the aggregate stock of capital, Kt. If asset-demand functions, b∗a,n and k∗, are
sufficiently close to linear in human capital, h, types, s, and in non-human wealth, b and
k, at the mass of Θt, I can expect approximate aggregation to hold. For my exercise,
the three aggregate states – Bt, RBt−1, Kt – are sufficient to describe the evolution of
the aggregate economy conditional on the aggregate shocks Ω.
While the law of motion for Zt is pinned down by (2.7), households use the following
log-linear forecasting rules for current inflation and the price of capital:
log pit = β1pi(Ω) + β2pi(Ω)Bˆt + β3pi(Ω)Kˆt + β4pi(Ω)RˆBt−1, (2.22)
log qt = β1q (Ω) + β2q (Ω)Bˆt + β3q (Ω)Kˆt + β4q (Ω)RˆBt−1, (2.23)
where (ˆ.) refers to log-differences from the steady state value of each variable and Ω
indicates the dependence on aggregate shocks. The law of motion for aggregate real
bonds, Bt, then follows from the government budget constraint (2.17). The Taylor-rule
(2.16) determines the motion of the nominal interest rate, RBt . The law of motion for
Kt results from (2.21).
Technically, finding the equilibrium is similar to Krusell and Smith (1997), as I need
to find market clearing prices within each period. Concretely, this means the posited
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rules, (2.22) and (2.23), are used to solve for households’ policy functions. Having
solved for the policy functions conditional on the forecasting rules, I then simulate n
independent sequences of economies for t = {1, . . . , T} periods, keeping track of the
actual distribution Θt. In each simulation the sequence of distributions starts from the
stationary distribution implied by the model without TFP and monetary policy shocks.
I then calculate in each period t the optimal policies for market clearing inflation rates
and capital prices assuming that households resort to the policy functions derived under
rule (2.22) and (2.23) from period t+1 onward. Having determined the market clearing
prices, I obtain the next period’s distribution Θt+1. In doing so, I obtain n sequences of
equilibria. The first 250 observations of each simulation are discarded to minimize the
impact of the initial distribution. I next re-estimate the parameters of (2.22) and (2.23)
from the simulated data and update the parameters accordingly. By using n = 20 and
T = 1250, it is possible to make use of parallel computing resources and obtain 20.000
equilibrium observations. Subsequently, I recalculate policy functions and iterate until
convergence in the forecasting rules.
The posited rules (2.22) and (2.23) approximate the aggregate behavior of the econ-
omy well. The minimal within sample R2 is above 99.9%. Out-of-sample performance
as defined by Den Haan (2010) is also good. See Appendix B.
3.2 Solving the household planning problem
In solving for the households’ policy functions I apply an endogenous grid point method
as originally developed in Carroll (2006) and extended by Hintermaier and Koeniger
(2010), iterating over the first-order conditions. I approximate the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity/employment state process by a discrete Markov chain with 4 states, using the
method proposed by Tauchen (1986).12,13
4. Calibration
I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy over the time period 1984Q1 to 2008Q3 as my
focus lies on conventional monetary policy. One period in the model is a quarter. Table
2.1 summarizes the calibration. In detail, I choose the parameter values as follows.
4.1 Households
I assume that the felicity function is of constant-relative-risk-aversion form: u(x) =
1
1−ξx
1−ξ, where ξ = 2, a standard value. The time-discount factor, β = 0.985, and the
capital market participation frequency, ν = 0.075, are jointly calibrated to match the
ratio of capital and government bonds to output.14 I equate capital to all capital goods
12I solve the household policies for 40 points on the grid for bonds and 40 points on the grid for
capital. For aggregate bonds, aggregate capital, and last period’s nominal interest rate I use a grid of
3 points each, while for TFP I use 7 points and 7 for the iid monetary shock.
13Details on the algorithm can be found in Chapter 1.
14The participation frequency of 7.5% is higher than in the optimal participation framework of
Kaplan and Violante (2014). They find a participation frequency of 4.5% for working households given
a fixed-adjustment cost of $500.
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relative to nominal GDP. The annual capital-to-output ratio is therefore 290%. This
implies an annual real return on capital of about 4%. I equate government bonds to the
outstanding government debt held by private domestic agents, which implies an annual
bonds-to-output ratio of 31%.
I set the borrowing limit in bonds, b, such that 20% of households have negative net
worth as in the Survey of Consumer Finances (2007). This implies a relatively tight
borrowing limit that equals the average quarterly income.
I calibrate the stochastic process for the employment state to capture the distribu-
tion of wealth in the U.S. economy. In particular, I determine the share of entrepreneur-
households to match a Gini coefficient of 0.82. For simplicity, I assume that the prob-
ability of becoming an entrepreneur is the same for workers independent of their labor
productivity and that, once they become a worker again, they draw their labor produc-
tivity from a uniform distribution. I set the quarterly standard deviation of persistent
shocks to idiosyncratic labor productivity to 0.08. The quarterly autocorrelation is
0.987 – a standard value in the literature. This implies for the baseline calibration that
on average 1% of households are entrepreneurs.
4.2 Intermediate, Final, and Capital Goods Producers
The labor and capital share including profits (2/3 and 1/3) align with long-run U.S.
averages. The persistence of the TFP shock is set to ρZ = 0.9. The standard deviation
of the TFP shock, σZ = 0.005, is calibrated to make the model match the standard
deviation of H-P-filtered U.S. output.
To calibrate the parameters of the resellers’ problem, I use standard values for
markup and price stickiness that are widely employed in the New Keynesian literature
(c.f. Christiano et al., 1999). The Phillips curve parameter κ implies an average price
duration of 4 quarters, assuming flexible capital at the firm level. The steady state
marginal costs, exp(−µ) = 0.95, imply a markup of 6%. I calibrate the adjustment cost
of capital, φ = 10, to match the relative investment volatility in the United States.
4.3 Central Bank and Government
I target an average annual inflation rate of 2% according to the Federal Reserve System’s
inflation objective. I set the real return on bonds to 3.5% in line with the average
federal funds rate in the U.S in real terms from 1984 to 2008.15 Hence, the nominal
return is RB = 1.0136 quarterly. Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) provide an estimate
for the parameter governing interest rate smoothing, ρRB = 0.95, while the central
bank’s reaction to inflation deviations from target is standard, θpi = 1.5. The standard
deviation of the monetary policy shock, σD, is 71 basis points annually (c.f. Christiano
et al., 1999).
The government levies a proportional tax on labor income and profits to finance
government purchases and interest expense on debt. I adjust 1 − τ = 0.3 to close the
budget constraint given the interest expense and a government-spending-to-GDP ratio
of 20% in steady state. Government purchases, in turn, react to debt deviations from
15I obtain real returns by subtracting the GDP deflator from the Effective Federal Funds Rate. Both
time series are retrieved from the FRED database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description Target
Households
β 0.985 Discount factor K/Y = 290% (annual)
ν 7.5% Participation frequency B/Y = 23% (annual)
ξ 2 Coefficient of rel. risk av. Standard value
γ 0.5 Inv. Frisch elasticity Standard value
Intermediate Goods
α 72% Share of labor Income share of labor of 66%
δ 1.35% Depreciation rate NIPA: Fixed assets & durables
ρZ 0.9 Persistence of TFP shock Standard value
σZ 0.03 STD of TFP shock STD(Y )=1
Final Goods
κ 0.08 Price stickiness Avg. price duration of 4 quarters
µ 0.06 Markup 6% markup (standard value)
Capital Goods
φ 10 Capital adjustment costs STD(I)/STD(Y )=3.5
Fiscal Policy
1− τ 0.3 Tax rate Budget balance
γ1 0.05 G in steady state G/Y = 20%
γ2 0.1 G reaction function Small value
Monetary Policy
Π 1.005 Inflation 2% p.a.
RB 1.0136 Nominal interest rate 5.5% p.a.
θpi 1.5 Reaction to inflation Standard value
ρRB 0.95 Interest rate smoothing Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)
σD 18e-3 STD of monetary shock Christiano et al. (1999)
Income Process
ρh 0.987 Persistence of productivity Standard value
σ¯ 0.08 STD of innovations Standard value
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steady state such that the debt level remains bounded. Specifically, I choose γ2 = 0.1,
which ensures that the reaction of government spending builds up very slowly and, thus,
interference with the aggregate consequences of monetary shocks is minimized.
4.4 Model Fit
Table 2.2 reports the business cycle statistics implied by the model. The volatility of
output and investment are calibrated to U.S. data, while the remaining statistics and
variables are not targeted. The most striking fact is the low volatility of government
spending. This is the result of the passive nature of government spending in the model
as it only moderately reacts to stabilize debt and does not feature any shocks. The
volatility of government spending is deliberately low to keep interference with monetary
shocks minimal.
Table 2.2: Business cycle statistics
Model Data
STD CORR AC(1) STD CORR AC(1)
GDP 1.02 1.00 0.74 0.97 1.00 0.72
Consumption 0.77 0.99 0.74 0.85 0.88 0.68
Investment 3.50 0.94 0.71 4.42 0.87 0.79
Gov. spending 0.43 0.15 0.96 1.22 -0.08 0.49
Notes: Standard deviation, correlation with GDP, and autocorrelation after log-HP(1600)-
filtering. Standard devation is multiplied by 100.
Figure 2.1 (a) shows the liquidity of portfolios across the wealth distribution. I
measure this as the total amount of liquid assets a household might withdraw (up to
the borrowing constraint) relative to total wealth. The poorest households hold almost
all their wealth in liquid assets. As households become richer the share of liquid assets
in their portfolios falls. As the wealth-to-income ratio increases, the optimal share of
liquid assets falls because the marginal value of liquidity declines for given income and
households rather invest in the high-return illiquid asset. The declining share of liquid
assets in household portfolios generated by the model approximately matches U.S. data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances (2007).
The model also performs well in matching U.S. wealth inequality. Figure 2.1 (b)
compares the Lorenz curve of wealth implied by the model to U.S. data. The U.S. Gini
coefficient of 0.82 is matched by construction, but the model also generates realistic
shares in total wealth across all percentiles of the wealth distribution.
70
Figure 2.1: Household portfolios
(a) Portfolio liquidity (b) Wealth inequality
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Notes: U.S. data corresponds to the Survey of Consumer Finances (2007).
(a): Maximum withdrawal of liquid assets relative to total wealth. U.S.: Liquid assets include
all financial assets except for stocks (incl. mutual funds that primarily hold stocks) minus
unsecured credit. Illiquid assets include all non-financial assets plus stocks minus secured
credit. I assume the same borrowing limit as in the model ($20.000) and exclude all households
with more unsecured credit.
(b): Wealth Lorenz curve in the model (dashed line) against Lorenz curve of wealth defined
as financial plus nonfinancial assets minus debt for the U.S. (solid line).
5. Results
This section discusses the transmission of monetary policy shocks to the aggregate
economy and, in particular, the transmission channels. I first discuss the theoretical
channels through which monetary policy affects aggregates in this model and then com-
pare the aggregate effects in the economy with heterogeneity in household portfolios to
the same economy with a representative household.16 I elaborate on heterogeneity in
the savings response across the wealth distribution to highlight the importance of het-
erogeneity in household portfolios for aggregate outcomes. The section concludes with
an assessment of redistribution through inflation as a potential transmission channel of
monetary policy.
5.1 Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy
Key for understanding the transmission of monetary policy in any DSGE model is
the household consumption-savings decision. The decision problem of households in
an incomplete-markets setting differs from that of a representative household in that
16The representative household version of the model does not feature limited participation in the
capital market because households are perfectly insured through state-contingent claims. I keep the
parameters of the model unchanged to isolate the effect of heterogeneity in household portfolios on the
transmission of monetary policy.
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borrowing constraints apply. This gives rise to differences in optimal decisions as house-
holds take the existence of borrowing constraints into account or might actually be at
the constraint. The response of consumption and savings to monetary shocks hence
differs between an economy with and without complete markets. The effect of mone-
tary policy on household decisions, in turn, can be split into direct and indirect effects
along the lines of Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Monetary policy transmission mechanism in the model
Decision Variable Determined by Relevant prices Effect is
sequence of Euler equations {RBt−1/pit} direct
intertemporal
consumption {Xt}t=0...∞ life-time budget {wt, rt, pit}
-savings
borrowing constraints {wt, rt, pit, qt} indirect
intratemporal {Nt}{Ct = marginal dis- {wt}
labor-leisure Xt +G(Nt)} utility of work
Notes: The table breaks the household problem down into inter- and intratemporal decisions.
The gray shaded block represents the effects of monetary policy through general equlibrium
changes in prices, i.e. the indirect effects. Borrowing constraints (in bold) only bind in
the incomplete markets version of the model.
Consider a contractionary monetary policy shock. All else equal, an increase in
the nominal interest rate increases the real return on nominal assets and, thus, the in-
tertemporal relative price of composite consumption of leisure and goods, Xt, today vs.
tomorrow.17 I refer to the interest rate channel as the direct effect of monetary policy.
Since prices are sticky, the decrease in consumption is not completely offset by lower
prices, and output falls. Lower output, in turn, decreases income and consumption,
which again reduces income and so forth. I refer to the equilibrium changes in income
and prices as the indirect effects of monetary policy.
In the complete markets economy, these indirect effects matter for composite con-
sumption only in so far as they change life-time income, because the consumption path
is determined by a sequence of Euler equations and a single life-time budget constraint.
The consumption of final goods, Ct, and labor supply, Nt, follows then through the in-
tratemporal consumption-leisure trade-off that solely depends on the wage rate. With
17Recall that the household problem can be expressed in terms of composite consumption Xt with
GHH preferences: xit = cit − τ1wthitNt1+γ . It is therefore the intertemporal allocation of composite
consumption that matters for the household in this model.
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incomplete markets, however, current income becomes an important determinant of
composite consumption and, thus, consumption of final goods because of borrowing
constraints.
The indirect effects of monetary policy, therefore, work through the (life-time) bud-
get constraint and the complementarity of consumption and hours worked inherent in
GHH preferences in this model. This paper is about the effect of borrowing constraints
on household decisions through the budget constraint channel. For this purpose, GHH
preferences and the specific form of the disutility of labor adopted are helpful. They
rule out wealth effects on labor supply and more generally make labor supply indepen-
dent of all idiosyncratic states. As a result, labor supply only depends on the aggregate
wage rate in both versions of the model and, thus, does not contribute to differences in
the response to monetary shocks.
The complementarity of leisure and hours worked does matter for the total response,
of course, as this is an important factor in the determination of consumption of final
goods.18 It is hence the difference in the response of composite consumption between
both economies that identifies the effect of borrowing constraints. The quantitative
assessment of the differences between both economies comes next.
5.2 Aggregate Effects of a Monetary Policy Shock
In the following, I consider the effect of a monetary surprise that, all else equal, would
increase the nominal interest rate by one-standard deviation, i.e. 18 basis points (quar-
terly), in period 0. Figure 2.2 compares the responses of the economy with and without
heterogeneity in household portfolios.
What stands out immediately is that the aggregate responses of both economies are
very similar. In particular the responses of employment and wages are nearly identical
due to the specification of the preferences. The initial drop in output is 0.54 percent in
the full model and 0.48 percent in the representative household version of the model.
The composition of the output drop, however, is quite different. The fall in consumption
is steeper and more persistent in the economy with heterogeneous households, while the
reverse is true for investment.19 Consumption falls by 0.13 percentage points more and
the total consumption loss over 4 years is 0.31 percentage points higher with incomplete
markets. Looking at composite consumption Xt, which leaves out the effect of GHH
preferences, makes this more evident.
To assess the importance of the direct effect on consumption in both economies, I
compare the response of composite consumption to interest rate changes keeping all
other prices at steady state values. With complete markets, changing the path of the
real interest rate to the path in Figure 2.2 lowers composite consumption by 0.065
percent.20 This number reduces to 0.056 percent with incomplete markets.21
18More leisure time decreases the marginal utility of consumption with GHH preferences such that,
all else equal, consumption falls with labor supply Nt.
19Government spending does not respond in period 0. The responses differ at the maximum by 0.02
percentage points and, thus, are not of importance for differences in the output responses.
20I feed the path of the real interest rate into the Euler equation and budget constraint of the
representative household without changing any other prices to determine the partial consumption
response.
21The path of the real interest rate differs between both economies. Assuming the same path as in the
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Figure 2.2: Response to a one-standard deviation monetary shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock, D =
18 basis points. Solid line: the model with heterogeneous households. Dashed line:
same calibration with a representative household. Dots: solid-dashed. The y-axis
shows either percent or basis points deviations from the no-shock path. The x-
axis shows time since the shock in quarters. *LP = (qt+1 + rt+1)/qt − RBt /pit+1
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Comparing these numbers to the equilibrium response of composite consumption
in Figure 2.2 identifies the indirect effect through income. Composite consumption
falls almost three times more in the economy with incomplete markets relative to the
direct response, whereas it barely changes with complete markets. What matters for
composite consumption of the representative household is life-time income as savings
adjust to undo any effect of temporary income losses on consumption. Therefore, the
indirect effect through the life-time budget constraint is of minor importance. Current
income, however, responds strongly and so does composite consumption with market-
incompleteness because of borrowing constraints. The indirect effect through tighter
borrowing constraints, therefore, more than outweighs the muted direct effect of interest
rate changes on consumption in the full model.
Quantitatively, the indirect effect explains 65% of the drop in composite consump-
tion with market-incompleteness, while the direct effect through interest rate changes
accounts for only 35%. This difference becomes substantially higher when the indirect
effect through GHH preferences is included. Looking at consumption of final goods,
indirect effects make up for more than 90% of the total response. The GHH effect,
however, is also present in the complete-markets setting. It also accounts for 87.5%
of the response in consumption of final goods there. This is driven by the adopted
preference specification, of course, and vanishes with additively separable preferences
in consumption and leisure. With such preferences, the response of composite con-
sumption applies, which is completely determined by the direct effect with complete
markets.
The stronger reaction of consumption to monetary shocks is not reflected in output
because investment falls by 25% less with incomplete versus complete markets. The
smaller reaction of investment is a consequence of the redistributive effects of monetary
policy in the full model. A tightening of monetary conditions increases inequality
because it redistributes from borrowers to lenders and from households that earn wage-
income to those that earn profit-income. Both channels transfer from the bottom to
the top of the wealth distribution and hence increase inequality.22 Wealthy households
hold relatively more high-return real assets in their portfolios, recall Figure 2.1, and,
thus, stabilize investment demand as they get richer through redistribution.
This points to the importance of heterogeneity in portfolios for aggregate outcomes.
The redistributive consequences of monetary policy are discussed next.
5.3 Importance of Heterogeneity for the Transmission
With incomplete markets, the transmission of monetary policy also works through re-
distributive effects. Household portfolios in the model differ in net nominal positions,
real asset holdings, and human capital. This section quantifies the relative importance
of gains and losses on these three dimensions for the transmission. Let me discuss the
channels in turn. A higher real rate of interest benefits bondholders at the expense
of debtors. Both lenders and borrowers, however, lose on their real asset holdings as
asset prices and dividends fall. Labor income declines as well, while income from profit
increases.
complete markets benchmark shows that consumption falls by 25% less with market-incompleteness.
22These findings mirror recent empirical evidence by Coibion et al. (2012).
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Table 2.4: Exposure to monetary shocks by wealth holdings
Income gains/losses Capital gains/losses
By wealth Interest Dividends Labor/Profit on real assets
percentiles ∆(RBt−1/pit) ∆rt ∆(WtNt + Πt) ∆qt
0-10 -0.23 -0.00 -1.62 -0.00
10-20 -0.10 -0.01 -1.57 -0.04
20-30 -0.03 -0.03 -1.53 -0.13
30-40 0.02 -0.05 -1.51 -0.21
40-50 0.04 -0.08 -1.49 -0.31
50-60 0.06 -0.11 -1.45 -0.43
60-70 0.08 -0.14 -1.40 -0.56
70-80 0.10 -0.20 -1.28 -0.80
80-90 0.15 -0.52 0.01 -2.11
90-100 0.29 -1.27 1.39 -5.18
Notes: Gains and losses in percent of within group consumption in period 0 to a one-standard
deviation monetary policy shock, D = 18 basis points. Results are expressed in terms of
steady-state consumption of each decile and averaged by using frequency weights from the
steady-state wealth distribution.
Table 2.4 summarizes the gains and losses on each of the three portfolio dimensions
across the wealth distribution relative to average consumption of each wealth bracket.
The sizable fall in labor income represents the single largest loss for the bottom 80%
of the wealth distribution. Households in the top quintile of the wealth distribution, in
contrast, enjoy higher returns on their human capital on average, because an over-
proportionate share are entrepreneurs. As such, they receive profit income, which
increases. The top quintile incurs the highest losses on the real asset position. However,
most of it is due to lower asset prices that are not completely realized. In addition,
those households are also the largest bondholders and, thus, gain on that account from
higher real returns. All in all, the top 10% of households in terms of net worth stands
to gain from a monetary tightening as long as they do not realize more than 8% of their
capital losses. This is clearly the case as Figure 2.3 shows.
Investment Response
Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the portfolio adjustments to the monetary shock
across the wealth distribution. The charts in the first row show the change in bond and
capital holdings, whereas the second row depicts the contribution of each decile of the
wealth distribution to the total change.
Two results stand out. First, the response of the top 20% in terms of net worth
explains more than 50% of the change in aggregate savings in bonds and capital. Sec-
ond, the response of capital declines in wealth holdings. The wealthiest households
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liquidate only a very small fraction of their capital holdings, while capital holdings by
the poorest decile falls 5 times more than aggregate capital. Wealthy households do not
only adjust their capital holdings little, but they also account for the majority of the
aggregate capital response. As a consequence, higher inequality stabilizes investment
as it broadens the difference in the capital response between the top and the bottom.
It is therefore the redistributive consequences of monetary policy that explain the sig-
nificantly weaker response of investment in the incomplete markets economy relative to
the complete markets setting, in which no redistribution occurs by definition.
In fact, the investment response would be even more muted if the liquidity premium,
i.e. the return on capital relative to the return on bonds, remained at its steady-
state value. The relative return on bonds, however, increases to absorb the additional
supply of government bonds created by the shortfall in tax revenues. In equilibrium,
the liquidity premium falls 3 by basis points (cf. Figure 2.2). This makes wealthy
household invest more in bonds as they would otherwise do.
Figure 2.3: Portfolio adjustments to a monetary shock
(a) Bond response ∆ log bit+1 (b) Capital response ∆ log kit+1
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Notes: Change in savings in bonds and capital to a one-standard deviation monetary
policy shock, D = 18 basis points in period 0. The first row shows the average savings
response of all households in a given decile of the wealth distribution. The second row
shows how much each decile contributes to the aggregate change in bond and capital
holdings. The policies are averaged using frequency weights from the steady-state wealth
distribution.
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Consumption Response
The redistributive consequences of monetary policy do not only matter for the invest-
ment response, but also for the consumption response. Debt deflation is a prominent
channel, going back at least to Fisher (1933), that has potentially strong effects on
consumption as indebted households are closer to the borrowing constraint. In the fol-
lowing, I assess the importance of this channel for consumption across households and
aggregate outcomes.
Figure 2.4: Consumption response to a monetary shock with nominal vs. real debt
(a) Consumption cit (b) Composite Consumption xit
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Notes: Average consumption response of all households in a given quintile of the wealth
distribution to a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock, D = 18 basis points, in
period 0. The left columns correspond to the full model with nominal debt and right ones to
the same model with real debt. The policies are averaged using frequency weights from the
steady-state wealth distribution.
Heterogeneity in portfolios and, thus, in the exposure to monetary shocks generates
sizable heterogeneity in household consumption. The left bars in Figure 2.4 plot the
change in consumption by wealth holdings in the baseline economy with nominal debt.
The effect on consumption of final goods includes both the effect of lower income and less
hours worked through the complementarity of consumption and leisure. Consumption
by households in the first quintile declines by 2 times more than consumption by the top
quintile in terms of net worth. This difference becomes more pronounced by considering
consumption of the composite good Xt as it leaves out the GHH effect that applies to all
households. The ratio of consumption between top and bottom quintile of the wealth
distribution increases from 2 to 3 in this case.
Households in the first quintile of the wealth distribution suffer not only from sub-
stantially lower earnings, but also from a higher real rate on nominal debt (c.f. Table
2.4). The effect of the latter goes only through surprise inflation in period 0. By
assumption, the monetary shock affects the nominal interest rate tomorrow but not
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today.
This timing assumption allows to shut down the initial redistribution through dif-
ferences in net nominal positions by considering an economy with real debt (inflation-
indexed bonds). The right bars in Figure 2.4 show the response of consumption in the
same economy but with real debt. Indebted households gain the most, but also lenders
gain because the indirect effects of monetary policy become weaker. Considering con-
sumption of composite goods identifies the importance of indirect effects through the
budget constraint. Clearly, this effect is the dominant one for the first quintile of the
wealth distribution, while richer households gain little as they are further away from
the borrowing constraint.
Figure 2.5: Marginal propensity to consume
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quarterly income. Human capital is integrated out using the steady-state joint-distribution.
All in all, redistribution through inflation explains about 15% of the total output loss
in Figure 2.2. Redistribution through inflation amplifies the indirect effects of monetary
policy because it is strongly correlated with marginal propensities to consume (MPC).
Figure 2.5 shows the MPCs across capital and bond holdings. Clearly, consumption
becomes more sensitive to current income the less liquid bonds a household holds.
Lower than expected inflation therefore redistributes from households with high MPCs
to households with low MPCs. This depresses aggregate consumption and, thus, output.
6. Conclusion
Heterogeneity in household portfolios has important implications for the transmission
of monetary policy. This paper quantifies the consumption and savings response to
monetary shocks in a New Keynesian business cycle model with incomplete markets
and assets with different degrees of liquidity. When markets are incomplete, the direct
effect of changes in interest rates explains less than half of the consumption response to
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monetary policy shocks. The response of consumption is primarily driven by indirect
equilibrium changes in income that strongly affect consumption by liquidity-constrained
households. The equilibrium effects, in turn, mainly work through changes in labor
income. Redistribution through the revaluation of nominal claims, including Fisher
(1933) debt deflation, reinforces the effect on consumption. At the same time, the
redistributive consequences of monetary policy imply a muted investment response.
The share of real assets in household portfolios increases in household wealth such that
second-round changes in inequality affect the investment response.
This is in stark contrast to the transmission mechanism in standard New Keyne-
sian models that build on a representative household. When borrowing constraints do
not apply, temporary changes in income are not of importance and monetary shocks
do hardly affect life-time income. Consequently, consumption responds solely to the
changes in interest rates. Savings, in contrast, react strongly and undo any temporary
mismatch between income and consumption.
The reversal of the importance of direct and indirect effects in the transmission
mechanism has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. When mar-
kets are incomplete, the power of interest rates to affect aggregate economic activity
relies to a large extent on equilibrium effects on labor income. The response of labor
income, in turn, depends on a functioning labor market. In particular, how much does
demand for labor respond to changes in aggregate demand? Labor market frictions
or financial frictions on the side of firms might, therefore, impede the transmission of
monetary policy. Provided the transmission works, mistakes in the setting of the inter-
est rate still imply larger consumption volatility. Therefore, welfare costs of monetary
policy shocks might be substantially higher than previously thought. Moreover, the
weakening of the interest rate channel questions the existing results on optimal mon-
etary policy rules. It is thus important to reassess the optimality of the properties of
the Taylor-rule in a New Keynesian model with incomplete markets.
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Appendices
A. First Order Conditions
Denote the optimal policies for consumption, bond holdings, and capital holdings as
x∗i , b
∗
i , k
∗, i ∈ {a, n} respectively. Let z be a vector of potential aggregate states. The
first-order conditions for an inner solution in the (no-)adjustment case read:
k∗ :∂u(x
∗
a)
∂x
q =βE
[
ν
∂Va(b∗a, k∗; z′)
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(b
′
a, k
′; z′)
∂k
]
(2.24)
b∗a :
∂u(x∗a)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(b∗a, k∗; z′)
∂b
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(b
∗
a, k
∗; z′)
∂b
]
(2.25)
b∗n :
∂u(x∗n)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(b∗n, k; z′)
∂b
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(b
∗
n, k; z′)
∂b
]
(2.26)
Note the subtle difference between (2.25) and (2.26), which lies in the different capital
stocks k′ vs. k in the right-hand side expressions.
Differentiating the value functions with respect to k and b, I obtain the following:
∂Va(b, k; z)
∂k
= ∂u[x
∗
a(b, k; z)]
∂x
(q(z) + r(z)) (2.27)
∂Va(b, k; z)
∂b
= ∂u[x
∗
a(b, k; z)]
∂x
RB(z)
pi(z) (2.28)
∂Vn(b, k; z)
∂b
= ∂u[x
∗
n(b, k; z)]
∂x
RB(z)
pi(z) (2.29)
∂Vn(b, k; z)
∂k
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(b, k; z)]
∂x
(2.30)
+ βE
[
ν
∂Va[b∗n(b, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂V
n[b∗n(b, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
]
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(b, k; z)]
∂x
+ βνE∂u{x
∗
a[b∗n(b, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂x
(q(z′) + r(z′))
+ β(1− ν)E∂Vn{[b
∗
n(b, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂k
The marginal value of capital in the case of non-adjustment is defined recursively.
Substituting the second set of equations into the first set of equations I obtain the
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following Euler equations (in slightly shortened notation):
∂u[x∗a(b, k; z)]
∂x
q(z) =βE
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(b∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)] + (1− ν)∂V
n(b∗a, k′; z′)
∂k′
]
(2.31)
∂u[x∗a(b, k; z)]
∂x
=βER
B(z′)
pi(z′)
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(b∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(b∗a, k′; z′)]
∂x
]
(2.32)
∂u[x∗n(b, k, ; z)]
∂x
=βER
B(z′)
pi(z′)
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(b′n, k; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(b∗n, k; z′)]
∂x
]
(2.33)
B. Equilibrium Forecasting Rules
The equilibrium forecasting rules are obtained by regressing them in each iteration
of the algorithm on 20.000 observations. I generate the observations by simulating
the model in parallel on 20 machines, letting each economy run for 1250 periods and
discarding the first 250 periods. The R2 is generally above 99.99%. Table 2.5 shows
the equilibrium forecasting rules for monetary policy shocks at steady state TFP.
Table 2.5: Laws of motion
Law of motion for pi (R2 = 99.99)
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
β1pi 0.66 0.60 0.54 0.49 0.43 0.37 0.32
β2pi -0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.36 -0.38 -0.40 -0.43
β3pi -1.58 -1.65 -1.63 -1.63 -1.67 -1.65 -1.77
β4pi -34.82 -35.06 -35.31 -35.54 -35.80 -35.97 -36.03
Law of motion for q (R2 = 99.99)
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
β1q 0.24 0.16 0.09 0.01 -0.07 -0.15 -0.23
β2q 7.09 7.15 7.18 7.24 7.30 7.34 7.39
β3q 8.34 8.55 8.90 9.19 9.46 9.54 9.82
β4q -43.22 -43.00 -42.75 -42.68 -42.93 -43.47 -43.85
Notes: All values are multiplied by 100 for readability.
Following Den Haan (2010), I also test the out-of-sample performance of the fore-
casting rules. For this I initialize the model and the forecasting rules at steady state
values, feed in the same shock sequence, but otherwise let them run independently. Fig-
ure 2.6 plots time series of the prices q and pi taken from the simulation of the model
and the forecasting rules. The equilibrium forecasting rules track the evolution of the
underlying model without any tendency of divergence. Table 2.6 summarizes the mean
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Figure 2.6: Out-of-sample forecast performance of forecasting rules
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Notes: Out-of-sample comparison between forecasting rules and model
zoomed in at t = {1000, ..., 1.500} for visibility; see Den Haan (2010).
and maximum difference between the series generated by the model and the forecasting
rules. The mean error for all four time series is less than 0.005%. The maximum errors
are small, too.
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Table 2.6: Forecasting errors
Price of Capital qt Inflation pit
Mean Error 0.004% 0.002%
Max Error 0.016% 0.007%
Notes: Percentage differences in out-of-sample fore-
casts between forecasting rules and model; see
Den Haan (2010).
C. Distributional Consequences: Gini Indexes
Figure 2.7 displays the Gini indexes for total wealth, income, and consumption. In-
equality in income and consumption instantaneously react to the expansionary mon-
etary policy shock, whereas wealth inequality slowly falls. The initial decrease in the
Gini index for income is about 5 times larger than the decrease in the Gini index for
consumption. This points to substantial consumption smoothing. The dynamics of in-
come inequality follow the response of inflation, which quickly returns to its steady state
value and with it profits as well. The decline in consumption inequality, by contrast, is
more persistent because of a prolonged time of lower wealth inequality.
Figure 2.7: Monetary policy shock: Gini indexes
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Notes: Impulse responses of Gini indexes of wealth, income, and consumption to an 18 basis
points monetary policy shock, D. The y-axis shows basis point changes (an increase of “100”
implies an increase in the Gini index from, say, 0.81 to 0.82).
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D. Recalibration of Investment Volatility
Figure 2.8 shows the impulse responses to a one-standard deviation monetary tighten-
ing for the economies with incomplete and complete markets. In this section, I have
recalibrated the capital adjustment costs in the latter economy to make both versions
match the same business cycle statistics.
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Figure 2.8: Response with recalibrated business cycle statistics
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock, D =
18 basis points. Solid line: the model with heterogeneous households. Dashed line:
same economy with a representative household and recalibrated capital adjustment
costs. The y-axis shows either percent or basis points deviations from the no-shock
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Stimulus Payments and
Precautionary Investment
Deficit-financed government transfers to households have been an impor-
tant part of the fiscal response to the last two recessions in the United
States. This paper assesses the aggregate effects of this type of fiscal inter-
vention in a New Keynesian business cycle model with incomplete markets
and portfolio choice between liquid public debt and illiquid physical assets.
In this environment, transfers do not only work through the disposable in-
come channel but also by affecting household liquidity. Transfers increase
individual liquidity and debt finance enhances market liquidity. This has
consequences when the government retires this debt. Then households shift
their savings into the physical asset to smooth consumption. This leads to
a prolonged increase in capital and output. This precautionary investment
channel dominates negative wealth effects of distortionary taxes making ag-
gregate effects expansionary independent of the mode of financing.
1. Introduction
Deficit-financed government transfers to households, so called fiscal stimulus payments,
have become part and parcel of the fiscal response to recessions. In the last two reces-
sion of 2001 and 2007-2009, U.S. households received one-off payments between $500
to $1000 amounting to fiscal outlays of 0.4 − 0.7% of annual GDP. Household-level
data from both episodes reveal that households spent on average around 25% of those
payments on consumption.1 The average size and the distribution of the consumption
response can be rationalized through liquidity constraints (see Kaplan and Violante,
2014). Whether this type of fiscal intervention is successful in stabilizing output, how-
ever, depends on the joint-response of consumption and investment. A key argument
against government transfers is that government deficits may crowd out private invest-
1See e.g. Johnson et al. (2006) and Parker et al. (2013). These studies have exploited the fact that
the timing of receipt of payment was based on the last two digits of individual Social Security Numbers
and, thus, effectively random. This randomization allows to estimate the causal effect of receipt of
payment on consumption relative to the control group of households that received the payment in a
different quarter.
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ment potentially offsetting any increase in consumption.
This paper accounts for both household consumption and portfolio decisions in
assessing the aggregate effects of fiscal stimulus payments. Toward this end, we build
a New Keynesian business cycle model with incomplete markets and portfolio choice
between liquid public debt and illiquid physical assets. Public debt can be traded
without frictions, whereas physical capital can only be adjusted with a fixed probability
each period. As in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), households value public debt as an
additional means of smoothing consumption.
Despite of public debt and capital being substitutes, we find that deficit-financed
government transfers may actually lead to a crowding-in of investment. Key for this
result is the transient nature of the increase in public debt. On impact, when fiscal
transfers and the increase in public debt take place, public debt only partly replaces
capital while total savings increase. When - foreseeable - the government starts to retire
this debt, households would like to hang on to their improved consumption-smoothing
capacity. This crowds in private investment. We find that a faster reversal in public
debt leads to a stronger boom in investment.
What is more, this precautionary investment channel is little affected by how public
debt is financed. This is in stark contrast to an economy without the liquidity effect of
public debt, in which financing by tax hikes or spending cuts lead to opposite investment
responses. When transfers are financed by distortionary taxes, the net wealth effect of
transfers is negative and, thus, savings fall in an economy with complete markets. When
financed by government spending cuts, transfers imply an increase in wealth and, thus,
a positive investment response. When markets are incomplete, however, the liquidity
effect dominates the wealth effect such that investment always increases independent
of the financing.
With these results, this paper contributes to the literature on the aggregate effects
of fiscal stimulus payments by highlighting the liquidity channel of public debt. Oh and
Reis (2012) build a model with incomplete markets and sticky prices, but abstract from
public debt and instead look into the effects of redistribution across households within
a period. Other studies feature Ricardian households to simplify the role of public debt.
Giambattista and Pennings (2013) compare the multiplier of government purchases and
transfer in a model with Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households. In a similar vein,
Mehrotra (2014) compares both multipliers in a borrower-lender economy. McKay and
Reis (2016) assess automatic fiscal stabilizers in a model in which Ricardian households
own the capital stock.
We also contribute to the literature that discusses the effects of public debt by rais-
ing the supply of assets. We share with Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) the focus on
precautionary motives, but go beyond their steady state analysis. We show that tran-
sitory increases in public debt do not crowd-out capital because of an investment boom
during the transition back to steady state. In a model without precautionary motives,
Woodford (1990) shows that higher public debt may crowd-in investment through loos-
ening liquidity constraints. The spirit of the analysis is closest to Challe and Ragot
(2011). They investigate a similar liquidity channel in the case of deficit-financed gov-
ernment spending shocks with a focus on the consumption response. They find as well
that liquidity effects dominate wealth effects leading to a crowding-in of consumption.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, 3, and 4 explain
changes made to the model, solution method, and calibration relative to Chapter 2.
Section 5 presents the quantitative results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
The model economy builds on Chapter 2 and, thus, we only describe the changes made
to the model presented in Chapter 2 in the following. The economic environment differs
as we consider different shocks and modify the fiscal rules. In particular, the economy
is only subject to deficit-financed transfer shocks. We next describe the modified house-
hold problem and government in more detail. The problem of firms is unchanged.
2.1 Households
The household problem is modified in two ways: First, lump-sum transfers from the
government are included in the budget constraint and, second, the tax rate might change
over time depending on the fiscal rule in place.
For those households participating in the capital market, the modified budget con-
straint reads:2
cit + bit+1 + qtkit+1 =
RBt−1
pit
bit + (qt + rt)kit + τt [sitwthitNt + (1− sit)Πt] + τ0,
kit+1 ≥ 0, bit+1 ≥ 0, (3.1)
where bit is the real value of nominal bond holdings, kit are capital holdings, qt is the
price of capital, rt is the rental rate or “dividend”, RBt−1 is the gross nominal return on
bonds, and pit = PtPt−1 is the inflation rate. τ0 is a lump-sum transfer paid out in period
t = 0 and τt is a proportional tax rate on labor income wthitNt and profit income Πt.
Households stochastically transit between receiving labor and profit income according
to idiosyncratic shock sit. We denote real bond holdings of household i at the end of
period t by bit+1 := b˜it+1Pt .
For those households that cannot trade in the market for capital the modified budget
constraint simplifies to:
cit + bit+1 =
RBt−1
pit
bit + rtkit + τt [sitwthitNt + (1− sit)Πt] + τ0,
bit+1 ≥ 0. (3.2)
With this setup, two Bellman equations characterize the dynamic planning prob-
lem of a household; Va in case the household can adjust its capital holdings and Vn
2The household problem can be expressed in terms of composite good xit by making use of cit =
xit + τtwthitNt1+γ .
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otherwise:3
Va(b, k, h, s; Θ) = max
k′,b′a
u[c(b, b′a, k, k′, h, s)] + β[νEV a(b′a, k′, h′, s′,Θ′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′a, k′, h′, s′,Θ′)],
Vn(b, k, h, s; Θ) = max
b′n
u[c(b, b′n, k, h, s)] + β[νEV a(b′n, k, h′, s′,Θ′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′n, k, h′, s′,Θ′)]. (3.3)
2.2 Central Bank and Government
Monetary policy follows the same Taylor (1993)-type rule as in Chapter 2 but is not
subject to shocks:
RBt
RB
=
(
RBt−1
RB
)ρ
RB (1 + pit
1 + pi
)θpi
. (3.4)
All else equal, the central bank raises the nominal rate above its steady-state value
RB whenever inflation exceeds its target value. It does so by more than one-to-one to
guarantee a non-explosive price path (θpi > 1). The parameter ρRB captures “intrinsic
policy inertia”.
The fiscal authority pays lump-sum transfers τ0 > 0 to households in period t = 0
that are financed by debt issuance. Let Bt+1 denote time t real value of public debt.
The government budget constraint reads:
Bt+1 =
RBt−1
1 + pit
Bt +Gt + τ0 − Tt, (3.5)
where real tax revenues are given by:
Tt = (1− τt)
[
(NtWt
∫
sihiΘt(b, k, h, s)) + Πt
]
. (3.6)
The government either adjusts taxes τt or government spending Gt to bring debt
back to its steady state value from t = 1 onwards. We assume simple linear rules similar
to the ones estimated by Leeper et al. (2010):
Gt = γ1 − γ2(Bt −B), (3.7)
τt = γ3 + γ4 log(Bt/B), (3.8)
with B equal to the steady state debt level. The parameters γ2, γ4 > 0 measure the
speed at which public debt returns to its steady state value.
2.3 Recursive Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium and market clearing conditions are unchanged.
3No conditioning on aggregate shocks is required. The transfer shock only occurs at t = 0 and then
the economy deterministically reverts back to steady state.
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3. Numerical Implementation
We compute the transitional dynamics after an unexpected one-off fiscal stimulus shock
with the help of Krusell and Smith (1998)-rules. We consider an economy that is in
steady state before period t = 0. In t = 0, all households receive an unexpected
fiscal transfer τ0. There are no more shocks from t = 1 onwards. From then on,
households anticipate how prices evolve on the path back to the long-run equilibrium
of the economy. These prices are, of course, a function of all states including the joint
distribution Θt(b, k, h). Hence, we assume that households predict future prices on the
basis of a restricted set of moments as in Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998).
Specifically, we make the assumption that households condition their expectations
on last period’s aggregate real bond holdings, Bt, last period’s nominal interest rate,
RBt−1, and the aggregate stock of capital, Kt. If asset-demand functions, b∗a,n and k∗,
are sufficiently close to linear in human capital, h, and in non-human wealth, b and k,
at the mass of Θt, we can expect approximate aggregation to hold. For this exercise,
the three aggregate states – Bt, RBt−1, Kt – are sufficient to describe the evolution of
the aggregate economy.
Households use the following log-linear forecasting rules for current inflation and
the price of capital:
log pit = β1pi + β2piBˆt + β3piKˆt + β4piRˆBt−1, (3.9)
log qt = β1q + β2q Bˆt + β3q Kˆt + β4q RˆBt−1, (3.10)
where (ˆ.) refers to log-differences from the steady state value of each variable. The
law of motion for aggregate real bonds, Bt, then follows from the government budget
constraint (3.5). The Taylor-rule (3.4) determines the motion of the nominal interest
rate, RBt . The law of motion for Kt is the same as in Chapter 2.
To find the deterministic law of motion in response to a zero-probability fiscal
stimulus payment shock, we need to solve for the market clearing prices each period.
Concretely, this means the posited rules, (3.9) and (3.10), are used to solve for the
households’ policy functions. Having solved for the policy functions conditional on the
forecasting rules, we then simulate the model for t = 0, . . . , T periods, keeping track of
the actual distribution Θt. The simulation starts in steady state and the transfer shock
hits in t = 0. We then calculate in each period t the optimal policies for market clearing
inflation rates and asset prices assuming that households resort to the policy functions
derived under rule (3.9) and (3.10) from period t+ 1 onwards. Having determined the
market clearing prices, we obtain next period’s distribution Θt+1. We next re-estimate
the parameters of (3.9) and (3.10) from the simulated data and update the parameters
accordingly. Subsequently, we recalculate policy functions and iterate until convergence
in the forecasting rules.
The posited rules (3.9) and (3.10) approximate the aggregate behavior of the econ-
omy well. The within sample R2 is well above 99%. See Appendix A.
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4. Calibration
One period in the model is a quarter. We adopt the calibration of Chapter 2 for the
household and firm side. The model of Chapter 2 is calibrated to U.S. business cycle
statistics and asset holdings by U.S. household. Fiscal policy is described either by a
tax or spending rule reacting to public debt deviations from steady state. We choose
the reaction parameters such that the path of debt is the same under both rules. Table
3.1 summarizes the calibration.
5. Results
In the following, we consider a policy experiment that consists of an unexpected, one-off
payment of about $500 (0.5% of annual output) to each household in the economy paid
out in t = 0. We assume that the policy is deficit financed in t = 0 and that from
t = 1 onwards either labor taxes or government spending react to debt deviations from
steady state according to a fiscal rule that brings debt back to its steady state value.
We first show that the model replicates the distribution of marginal propensities to
consume across households as documented by the empirical literature. We then assess
the aggregate effects of this type of fiscal intervention under both financing schemes
while keeping the path of debt constant. We do so in the full model in which public
debt affects household liquidity and in a representative agent version of the model to
highlight the importance of liquidity effects for aggregate outcomes.
5.1 Individual Consumption Response
Figure 3.1 plots the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) as a function of a house-
hold’s asset position. Throughout most of the asset-space households consume very
little out of the $500 payment by the government. This includes the diagonal along
which all households would be clustered if we were to consider net worth only. With
two assets, however, a large fraction of wealthy households prefers to hold high-return
illiquid over liquid assets (capital ki over bonds bi). This makes them potentially con-
strained in their consumption. In addition, these “wealthy hand-to-mouth” households
have a higher MPC than their poor counterparts without any assets. The MPC in-
creases in capital because richer households have a higher target for their consumption
path. For households very rich in capital but without any liquid assets it actually
reaches 90%, whereas households with no assets at all consume around 25% out of
extra cash.
These patterns are reminiscent of recent empirical findings on household consump-
tion behavior. Misra and Surico (2014), who use quantile regressions to identify het-
erogeneity in consumption responses, document that the households with the highest
MPCs hold little liquid assets. The model is able to replicate this finding because of
two features: First, markets are incomplete and households face idiosyncratic income
risk making them ex-post heterogeneous. Second, portfolio choice between liquid and
illiquid assets renders a large fraction of households constrained in their consumption
each period. Short-run fluctuations in marginal utility are less costly then foregoing
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Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description Target
Households
β 0.985 Discount factor K/Y = 290% (annual)
ν 4.5% Participation frequency B/Y = 23% (annual)
ξ 1.5 Coefficient of rel. risk av. Standard value
γ 0.5 Inv. Frisch elasticity Standard value
Intermediate Goods
α 72% Share of labor Income share of labor of 66%
δ 1.35% Depreciation rate NIPA: Fixed assets & durables
Final Goods
κ 0.08 Price stickiness Avg. price duration of 4 quarters
µ 0.06 Markup 6% markup (standard value)
Capital Goods
φ 10 Capital adjustment costs STD(I)/STD(Y )=3.5
Fiscal Policy
γ1 0.05 G in steady state G/Y = 20%
γ2 0.2 G reaction function Path of debt
γ3 0.3 Tax rate in steady state Budget balance
γ4 0.2 τ reaction function Path of debt
Monetary Policy
Π 1.005 Inflation 2% p.a.
RB 1.01 Nominal interest rate 4% p.a.
θpi 1.5 Reaction to inflation Standard value
ρRB 0.95 Interest rate smoothing Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)
Income Process
ρh 0.987 Persistence of productivity Standard value
σ¯ 0.08 STD of innovations Standard value
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the higher return on the illiquid asset.4
When it comes to the total effect of transfers, incomplete markets imply that it is
important to take into account the path of public debt. An increase in public debt en-
hances household liquidity by effectively loosening borrowing constraints (see Aiyagari
and McGrattan, 1998). When markets are incomplete, this has first order effects on
consumption and savings. In the following section, we discuss the role of public debt
for the aggregate effects of transfers.
Figure 3.1: Individual consumption response to a transfer shock
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Notes: Marginal propensities to consume in partial equilibrium with fixed prices. The bottom
of the graph depicts the distribution of households over capital and bond holdings relative to
annual income in steady state.
5.2 Aggregate Effects of Transfers Payments
This section assesses the aggregate effects of deficit-financed transfer payments in a
model in which public debt affects household liquidity. We compare two different fi-
nancing scenarios with opposing wealth effects while keeping the path of public debt
the same. We first discuss the effects of transfer payments with government spending
adjusting from t = 1 onwards. Under this scenario, the present-value wealth effect of
the fiscal intervention is positive.
Figure 3.2 shows the response of aggregate prices and quantities to the transfer
in the case of lower government spending in the future. The first row of Figure 3.2
depicts output and its components (consumption, investment, government spending)
as a percent of transfer. The solid line corresponds to the economy with endogenous
heterogeneity, whereas the dashed line shows the response of an economy with two types
4The idea that small deviations from optimal consumption imply negligible utility costs goes at
least back to Cochrane et al. (1989).
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of households: Ricardian households and hand-to-mouth households without access to
financial markets. We determine the share of hand-to-mouth households (about 30%)
by matching the consumption response of the full model in the first period.
Accordingly, consumption increases by 50% of the transfer in both economies. This
is about twice as much as the partial equilibrium response of consumption discussed in
the previous section. With sticky prices the initial increase in consumption is met by
higher production and, thus, higher income amplifying the direct effect of the trans-
fer on consumption. This disposable income channel, which relies on the presence of
households with high marginal propensities to consume, drives the output response in
the first period.
After the first period, the response of unconstrained households becomes central for
the path of output. Unconstrained households respond to the positive wealth effect by
increasing consumption permanently. To do so, households move wealth into the future.
In particular, they increase their holdings of physical assets as the government reduces
the amount of outstanding debt at the same time. This investment boom is stronger
with complete markets. Under incomplete markets, household portfolio choices are
influenced by precautionary motives, and investment therefore responds less strongly
because the portfolio composition matters for consumption smoothing (see also Chapter
2 for a similar argument in the case of monetary policy shocks).
The role of precautionary motives in shaping the investment response becomes more
evident in the case of higher future taxes (see Figure 3.3). Under this scenario, the
present-value wealth effect of the fiscal intervention is negative because of higher dis-
tortionary taxes. In the economy with limited heterogeneity, Ricardian households
react to the negative wealth effect by lowering their consumption and savings. This
leads to a crowding out of investment given the expansion of public debt. In the econ-
omy with endogenous heterogeneity, however, households still save in physical capital
because of precautionary motives. Households would like to hang on to their improved
consumption-smoothing capacity that the government brought about by increasing the
aggregate supply of savings devices. As the government retires its debt, this crowds in
private investment. The precautionary motives are also reflected in a lower liquidity
premium.
This precautionary investment channel breaks the downward spiral of lower capital
and lower labor supply, which occurs under complete markets. As a result, the output
response is positive despite the negative wealth effect. Without precautionary savings,
by contrast, increasing labor taxes to finance transfers leads to a long lasting recession
by crowding out capital.
Key for the crowding in of capital is the transient nature of the increase in public
debt. As in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), a permanent increase in public debt would
displace capital while total savings increase. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 show that a similar
logic applies to deficit-financed transfers. Investment initially falls but by substantially
less than the increase in bond holdings so that total savings increase significantly.
In contrast to a permanent increase in public debt, however, investment immediately
recovers as households respond to the reversal in public debt by shifting savings from
bonds to capital. After 40 quarters public debt is back at its steady state value and the
boom in investment comes to an end.
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Figure 3.2: Response to transfer shock (0.5% of annual output) under spending rule
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Notes: Impulse responses to a deficit-financed one-off transfer of 0.5% of annual
output with tax rule stabilizing debt. Solid line: the model with heterogeneous
households. Dashed line: same calibration with a representative household and rule-
of-thumb households. *LP = (qt+1 + rt+1)/qt −RBt /pit+1 **Xt =
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Figure 3.3: Response to transfer shock (0.5% of annual output) under tax rule
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Notes: Impulse responses to a deficit-financed one-off transfer of 0.5% of annual
output with tax rule stabilizing debt. Solid line: the model with heterogeneous
households. Dashed line: same calibration with a representative household and rule-
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Figure 3.4: Response to transfer shock (0.5% of annual output) for different paths of
public debt
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Notes: Impulse responses to a deficit-financed one-off transfer of 0.5% of annual output
for different parameterizations of the tax rule stabilizing debt. Solid line: Debt back at
steady state in 40 quarters. Uneven-dashed line: Debt back at steady state in 30 quarters.
Even-dashed line: Debt back at steady state in 20 quarters.
Figure 3.4 compares the output, consumption, and investment response for different
paths of public debt. We find that the investment boom is more pronounced for a
faster reversal in debt as implied by the precautionary investment motive. Households
rely on their savings to smooth consumption in the presence of idiosyncratic income
shocks. Hence, households react to a faster reversal in public debt by faster accumulat-
ing physical assets. In the case of a return to the steady state debt level in 20 quarters,
investment does not fall in the first period and the output response is 40% larger than
in the baseline.
6. Conclusion
Deficit-financed fiscal stimulus payments have become an important policy measure to
counteract recessions. In this paper, we ask whether the empirical evidence on a siz-
able consumption response to such transfers at the household level implies that this
type of fiscal intervention is indeed expansionary? We do so by building a New Key-
nesian business cycle model with heterogeneous households that takes into account the
financing of transfers and matches the empirical evidence on the individual consump-
tion response. Importantly, in this environment, transfers not only affect the aggregate
economy through the disposable income channel but also by enhancing household and
market liquidity because of debt finance.
To highlight the importance of this liquidity channel for the aggregate economy, we
contrast our model results to a two-agent model with Ricardian and hand-to-mouth
households, which replicates the consumption response to transfers but lacks the liq-
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uidity effect of public debt. In the two-agent model, Ricardian households would like to
reduce their consumption and savings in response to the negative wealth effect of higher
future distortionary taxes, inducing a persistent decline in investment and a prolonged
recession. In contrast, in the presence of potentially binding borrowing constraints, a
precautionary investment motive overturns this result as households would like to hang
on to their improved consumption smoothing capacity and, thus, shift their savings into
the physical asset when the government starts to retire its debt.
We find that this liquidity channel is stronger than wealth effects induced by gov-
ernment fincancing decisions and, thus, makes the aggregate effects of transfers expan-
sionary independent of the mode of financing.
Appendices
A. Equilibrium Forecasting Rules
Tables 3.2 displays the equilibrium laws of motion for the Krusell-Smith equilibrium.
Table 3.2: Laws of motion
β1 β2 β3 β4 R2
Spending Rule
βpi 0.50 -1.23 2.10 -23.69 99.73
βq 0.01 5.05 -43.21 -38.59 99.95
Tax Rule
βpi 0.50 -0.70 0.27 -24.09 99.76
βq 0.00 3.77 -28.61 -41.56 99.95
All values are multiplied by 100 for read-
ability.
The equilibrium forecasting rules are obtained by regressing them in each iteration
of the algorithm on the response of the economy to the transfer shock. The R2 is above
99%.
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